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Mass Tort Litigation and Inquisitorial Justice
HOWARD M. ERICHSON*
In the massive litigation brought by women against manufacturers of silicone
breast implants, something strange is afoot. For a number of years, plaintiffs'
medical experts have been opining that silicone breast implants caused the
plaintiffs to suffer autoimmune disease and other systemic maladies, and defen-
dants' medical experts have been opining to the contrary. Juries and judges
around the country have weighed the evidence presented by each side. Some
plaintiffs have won, some have lost. That's the adversary system.
But in 1996, Judge Robert E. Jones did an uncommon thing. Responsible for
seventy breast implant cases in the United States District Court for the District
of Oregon, Judge Jones appointed a panel of scientific experts to advise the
court on causation. Based on the panel's advice, Judge Jones declared inadmis-
sible plaintiffs' expert testimony concerning causation of connective tissue
disease by breast implants, and dismissed plaintiffs' claims.' In the consolidated
federal multidistrict litigation for breast implant cases, Judge Sam C. Pointer
appointed a similar panel of medical experts to advise the court on scientific
issues.2 The mere anticipation of that court-appointed panel's report influenced
the course of breast implant litigation. Plaintiffs reached a $3.2 billion settle-
ment with implant maker Dow Coming Corporation, driven in part by the
pressure of the anticipated report.3 The panel's findings, which were issued in
late 1998, will profoundly affect the future of breast implant claims.4
Something strange is happening in asbestos litigation as well. For many
* Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law, erichsho@shu.edu. My thanks
to Dan Burk, George Conk, Mark Denbeaux, Sara-Ann Erichson, Tracy Kaye, Judith Resnik, Michael
Risinger, Benjamin Schwartz, and Jay Tidmarsh for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts; to Paul
Matey and Janine Tramontana for their excellent research assistance; and to the Seton Hall Law School
faculty scholarship fund for financial support of this project.
1. See Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Or. 1996). The court severed
plaintiffs' claims of localized injury and deferred the effective date of the decision. See infra note 40.
2. See Order No. 31, May 31, 1996, In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig. (No.
CV92-P-10000-S, MDL 926) (N.D. Ala.) (order to show cause why science panel should not be
established, and appointing selection panel to recommend neutral experts); Order No. 31B, June 13,
1996 (No. CV92-P-10000-S, MDL 926) (N.D. Ala.) (confirming establishment of National Science
Panel), Order No. 31C, Aug. 23, 1996 (No. CV92-P-10000-S, MDL 926) (N.D. Ala.) (appointing
epidemiologist, immunologist, and rheumatologist to National Science Panel); Order No. 31D, Sept.
17, 1996 (No. CV92-P-10000-S, MDL 926) (N.D. Ala.) (appointing toxicologist to National Science
Panel); and Order No. 31E, Oct. 31, 1996 (No. CV92-P-10000-S, MDL 926) (N.D. Ala.) (giving
directions to National Science Panel) <http://www.fjc.gov/BREIMLIT/ORDERS/orders.htm>.
3. See Order Regarding Term Sheet, Scheduling Hearing Date and Re-Appointing Mediator, In re
Dow Coming Corp., (Bankr. E.D. Mich. July 8, 1998) (No. 95-20612); David J. Morrow, Implant
Maker Reaches Accord on Damage Suits, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1998, at Al.
4. See Summary of Report of National Science Panel (Nov. 30, 1998) <http://www.fjc.gov/
BREIMLIT/SCIENCE/summary.htm>; Gina Kolata, Panel Can't Link Breast Implants to Any Dis-
eases, N.Y. TIMSs, Dec. 2, 1998, at Al.
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years, plaintiffs exposed to asbestos have pursued claims against asbestos
manufacturers. Juries and judges have listened to the evidence presented by the
plaintiffs and defendants, mostly to determine whether the plaintiffs' injuries
were in fact caused by exposure to the particular defendants' asbestos products.
As in the breast implant litigation, some plaintiffs have won, some have lost.
But a different model presented itself in the cases of Amchem Products v.
Windsor (Georgine),5 decided by the Supreme Court in 1997, and Ortiz v.
Fibreboard (Ahearn),6 to be decided by the Supreme Court in 1999. Amchem
began with a momentous day on which plaintiffs filed their Complaint, defen-
dants filed their Answer, and both filed a Joint Motion for Conditional Class
Certification and a Joint Stipulation of Settlement. Ortiz was filed as the parties
put finishing touches on an agreement that they had reached. In each case, the
parties had negotiated an agreement before the suit was filed, and jointly sought
the court's approval of their class action settlement. In each case, the request for
class certification was conditioned on approval of the settlement. The district
courts painstakingly examined the merits of the proposed settlements before
approving them.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court rejected the Amchem settlement class action,
but left the door open for future mass tort settlement class actions.7 In Ortiz, the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the settlement class action,8 and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari, then vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of
Amchem. 9 On remand, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed its approval of the settlement
class action,1 ° and the Supreme Court again granted certiorari."
Amchem and Ortiz are not unique. In the past decade, settlement class actions
have become increasingly popular in mass tort litigation, having been used
successfully in cases such as the Dalkon Shield litigation,' 2 the Bjork-Shiley
heart valve litigation, 13 and the orthopedic bone screw litigation. 14 Although the
Supreme Court's opinion in Amchem has engendered some confusion over the
continued viability of mass tort settlement class actions, it appears that such
5. 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997). In the lower courts, the case was referred to as Carlough v. Amchem
Products and later as Georgine v. Amchem Products. Even after the Supreme Court's decision, the case
is sometimes referred to as Georgine, particularly in regard to the proposed settlement itself.
6. Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp., 162 F.R.D. 505 (E.D. Tex. 1995), afftd, 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996),
vacated and remanded, 117 S. Ct. 2503 (1997), reaffid, 134 F.3d 668 (5th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom.
Ortiz v. Fibreboard, 118 S. Ct. 2339 (1998). Although the Supreme Court granted certiorari under the
name Ortiz v. Fibreboard, the suit was originally filed as Ahearn v. Fibreboard and in mass tort and
class action circles is often referred to as Ahearn.
7. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619-21 (1997).
8. In re Asbestos Litig., 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996).
9. Flanagan v. Ahearn, 117 S. Ct. 2503 (1997) (mem.); Ortiz v. Fibreboard, 117 S. Ct. 2503 (1997)
(mem.).
10. In re Asbestos Litig., 134 F.3d 668 (5th Cir. 1998).
11. Ortiz v. Fibreboard, 118 S. Ct. 2339 (1998).
12. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989).
13. See Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141 (S.D. Ohio 1992), appeal dismissed, 14 F.3d 600 (6th
Cir. 1993).
14. See In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prod. Liab. Litig., 176 F.R.D. 158 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
[Vol. 87:19831984
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settlements remain a dominant approach to resolving mass tort lawsuits. With
increasing frequency, plaintiffs and defendants come to court holding hands,
and courts must launch their own vigorous inquiries into the merits of the
parties' proffered settlement.
Is this how we practice tort litigation in the United States? A breast implant
court launches its own investigation into the critical factual dispute? An asbestos
court pursues its own skeptical inquiry into the merits of a settlement that
plaintiffs and defendants have reached? What ever happened to the adversary
system?
In the world of mass tort litigation, 5 at least, we have sneaked away from the
traditional U.S. adversarial model of justice, and towards the inquisitorial model
common in the civil law countries of continental Europe and, to a lesser extent,
Latin America.1 6 We have turned toward inquisitorial justice not by design, but
by necessity and ad hoc innovation. In what appears to be a moment of
significance in the episodic evolution of the adjudicatory process, some judges
have turned to devices that, despite short-term resistance, may gain widespread
acceptance with time.
Using a comparative perspective, this article examines two salutary trends in
modem mass tort litigation: the use of court-appointed scientific experts and the
use of settlement class actions with a vigorous inquiry into the merits of the
settlement. Part I looks at court-appointed scientific experts, noting the growing
use of such experts in mass tort cases, despite most judges' reluctance to use
such experts. Part II addresses settlement class actions, which offer an appealing
path out of the morass of inefficient and inconsistent mass tort litigation, but
which raise troubling fairness issues, and thus should be permitted only if the
court vigorously inquires into the merits of the settlement. Part III examines the
similarities between these judicial devices and the inquisitorial justice model,
then considers the barriers of judicial culture and structure that hinder U.S.
judges' 7 from making regular and effective use of such inquisitorial tools.
Although court-appointed experts and well-scrutinized settlement class actions
15. " 'Mass tort' refers to conduct of one or more tortfeasors that causes widespread injury, where
the individual tort claims share some common factual basis. Most mass tort litigation can be classified
either as mass disaster litigation, which involves injuries suffered by many at one time and place, or
mass products liability litigation, which involves wide distribution of a defective product. The former
includes plane, train and bus crashes, building collapses, hotel fires, explosions, chemical spills, gas
leaks, and nuclear reactor accidents. The latter includes claims by consumers, workers and others for
product-caused injuries. "Mitchell A. Lowenthal & Howard M. Erichson, Modem Mass Tort Litigation,
Prior-Action Depositions and Practice-Sensitive Procedure, 63 FoRDHAM L. REv. 989, 994 (1995); see
also id. at 991 n.7 (listing representative mass tort litigations). The present article focuses largely on
mass products liability litigation, such as the asbestos, tobacco and breast implant cases, where the use
of court-appointed experts and settlement class actions has been most pronounced.
16. "Inquisitorial," as used in this article, refers to systems of adjudication in which the court, rather
than the litigants or their lawyers, exercises primary control over the fact-gathering process. See infra
text accompanying notes 133-66.
17. I do not mean "U.S. judges" to exclude state court judges. Rather, the term refers to federal and
state judges in the United States, as distinguished from judges in other countries.
1999] 1985
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can help courts reach just and efficient mass tort resolutions, their inquisitorial
nature renders widespread and effective adoption in this country unlikely in the
short term. Nevertheless, these recent trends in mass tort litigation may hint at
an evolution toward greater use of inquisitorial tools within the context of the
U.S. adversary system. Thus, while Part IV considers the possibility of legisla-
tive solutions to mass torts, it concludes with skepticism regarding the prospect
of congressional intervention in this arena, and with hope that courts may adapt
to make more effective use of less familiar approaches.
I. INQUISITORIAL FACT-GATHERING: COURT-APPOINTED EXPERTS
The use of expert witnesses in U.S. litigation is immense. One study found
expert testimony employed in eighty-six percent of civil trials, with an average
of 3.3 experts per trial.' 8 Rather than exerting a neutralizing influence on
adversarialism, however, expert testimony has become a fixture of the adversary
system. Virtually every expert witness is retained by a litigant, testifies on behalf of
that litigant, and is compensated by that litigant. Triers of fact attribute to the experts
whatever credibility their expertise and reasoning seem to warrant, and at the
same time attribute to them whatever bias adversary retention and preparation
imply. The experts themselves, some fear, may color their testimony to advance
partisan interests. t9 Litigation centering on disputed scientific or technical
issues can degenerate into a "battle of the experts," in which a trier of fact must
choose between two diametrically opposed but equally impressive-sounding
expert opinions on matters beyond the fact-finder's comprehension.
Judges in the United States have the power under Federal Rule of Evidence
706 and many state equivalents to appoint their own expert witnesses,20 but one
18. See Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 1113, 1119 (studying California civil
trials); see also William T. Pizzi, Expert Testimony in the U.S., 145 NEw L.J. 82 (1995) (discussing the"pressures in civil cases to expand the role of experts as there seems to be almost no issue on which an
expert could not be found willing to offer an opinion"). The ubiquity of experts is especially
pronounced in mass torts and other complex litigation. See JAY TIDMARSH & ROGER H. TRANGSRUD,
COMPLEX LITIGATION AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 1347 (1998) ("A functional adversary system in
complex cases would be unimaginable without expert testimony.").
19. See Dan L. Burk, When Scientists Act Like Lawyers: The Problem of Adversary Science, 33
JURIMETRICS J. 363, 368-70 (1993) (discussing possible causes and effects of "adversary science" in the
courts, including seduction of scientists by the "gaming" aspects of litigation and scientists' identifying
with partisan objectives). This is hardly a new problem. See, e.g., Keegan v. Minneapolis & St. Louis
R.R., 78 N.W. 965, 966 (Minn. 1899) ("Experts are nowadays often the mere paid advocates or
partisans of those who employ them, as much so as the attorneys who conduct the suit. There is hardly
anything, not palpably absurd on its face, that cannot now be proved by some so-called 'experts.' ").
20. See, e.g., FED. R. EvtD. 706 ("The court may on its own motion or on the motion of any party
enter an order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed, and may request the parties
to submit nominations. The court may appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon by the parties, and
may appoint expert witnesses of its own selection."); ALA. R. Evi. 706; CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 730-33;
GuAM R. EvID. 706; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 907.06. The inherent power of trial judges to appoint their own
experts was well established before the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See FED. R. EvlD.
706 advisory committee's note (1972); Scott v. Spanjer Bros., Inc., 298 F.2d 928, 930-31 (2d Cir.
1962). As early as 1901, Learned Hand advocated the use of neutral advisors. See Learned Hand,
Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARv. L. REV. 40, 55 (1901).
1986 [Vol. 87:1983
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would hardly realize this by looking at actual practice. Under Rule 706, the
court may select an expert agreed upon by the parties, or may select an expert of
its own choosing. The court informs the expert witness of his or her duties, and
the court or any party may call the witness to testify.2 Generally, the court
directs the parties to pay the chosen expert's compensation.22 In addition to the
use of Rule 706 court-appointed expert witnesses, a court also can appoint"special masters",23 or "technical advisors', 24 to assist the court in undertaking
a neutral investigation into disputed scientific facts.
Rarely do courts exercise their power to appoint neutral experts. In a 1988
survey of all active federal district court judges, researchers Joe Cecil and
Thomas Willging of the Federal Judicial Center found that only twenty percent
of the judges had ever appointed an expert.25 Among that twenty percent, most
had appointed an expert only once in their judicial career.26 Of the hundreds of
thousands of cases handled by the judges surveyed, there were only about 225
instances of experts appointed by the court.2 7 A study of California civil trials
found 1748 appearances by partisan experts in 529 cases, but not one reference
to a court-appointed expert. 28 The extreme reluctance of U.S. judges to appoint
21. See FED. R. EvID. 706(a).
22. See FED. R. Evil). 706(b).
23. See FED. R. CIv. P. 53 (providing for use of special masters in federal court); Burk, supra note
19, at 375 (favorably mentioning proposal for use of "Scientific Referees," i.e., scientifically trained
special masters to oversee collection and evaluation of scientific evidence); Margaret G. Farrell, Coping
with Scientific Evidence: The Use of Special Masters, 43 EMORY L.J. 927 (1994); see also MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LMGATION (Third) § 21.52 (1995) [hereinafter M.C.L.3d] ("Special masters have increasingly
been appointed for their expertise in particular fields, such as accounting and finance or the science or
technology involved in the litigation. Hence the distinction between special masters under Rule 53 and
court-appointed experts under FED. R. EvID. 706 has become blurred."); Linda J. Silberman, Judicial
Adjuncts Revisited-The Proliferation of Ad Hoc Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2131, 2141-73 (1989)
(discussing various uses of special masters). But see United States v. Microsoft, 147 F.3d 935, 955 &
n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (vacating Rule 53 appointment of special master in Microsoft antitrust case, and
noting that "[t]o the extent that adjudication may lead the court into deep technological mysteries,"
appointment of an expert witness under Federal Rule of Evidence 706 is "a far more apt way of
drawing on expert resources than the district court's unilateral, unnoticed deputization of a vice-judge
[under Rule 53]").
24. See Renaud v. Martin Marietta Corp., 749 F. Supp. 1545, 1548 (D. Colo. 1990), affid, 972 F.2d304, 308 (10th Cir. 1992); Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 154-55, 159-60 (1st Cir. 1988); Sheila
L. Birnbaum & Gary E. Crawford, Why Courts Hesitate to Appoint Experts, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 26, 1992,
at 16. "[T~he [technical] advisor's role is to act as a sounding board for the judge-helping the jurist to
educate himself in the jargon and theory disclosed by the testimony and to think through the critical
technical problems." Reilly, 863 F.2d at 158. One of the most useful roles for technical advisors is
helping courts determine the admissibility of scientific expert testimony. See Renaud, 749 F. Supp. at
1548; see also FED. R. EvID. 104 (concerning judge's responsibility to make preliminary determinations
of evidence admissibility and witness qualifications). But see Silberman, supra note 23, at 2171-72
(expressing concern over lack of formal procedural safeguards for use of technical advisors).
25. See Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Accepting Daubert's Invitation: Defining A Role for
Court-Appointed Experts in Assessing Scientific Validity, 43 EMORY L.J. 995, 1004 (1994).
26. See id. at 1005.
27. See id. at 1004-05 & n.35.
28. See Gross, supra note 18, at 1191. The California evidence code allows court appointment of
experts. See CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 730-33 (1986).
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experts has not gone unnoticed.2 9 To many observers, this reluctance is particu-
larly worrisome in scientifically complex cases, 30 and particularly unjustifiable
in cases where the plaintiffs are many and the stakes are high.3'
The last few years, however, have witnessed an increased use of court-
appointed experts in mass tort litigation, as judges have struggled with the
cases' scientific complexities and grown frustrated with the battle of adversary
experts. In mass tort litigation, especially cases involving exposure to allegedly
toxic substances, courts cannot avoid difficult scientific questions. Traditionally,
courts in the United States have handled complex scientific issues much like
any other factual dispute-by allowing each side to make its adversarial pitch,
and then by deciding who is right. Courts have had tb determine whether certain
expert evidence is admissible, but generally have addressed the admissibility
question itself in adversarial terms, with the parties presenting their arguments
and a relatively passive adjudicator deciding who is right.
In 1993, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,32 the Supreme Court
reemphasized the duty of federal judges to serve as scientific evidentiary
gatekeepers.33 By emphasizing judicial responsibility for scientific factfinding,
29. See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 706 advisory committee's note (1972) ("experience indicates that actual
appointment is a relatively infrequent occurrence"); 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 706[01], at 706-13 (noting the "remarkably few cases in which federal judges
have appointed experts"); Birnbaum & Crawford, supra note 24, at 16; Stephen Breyer, The Interdepen-
dence of Science and Law, Address at the 1998 AAAS Annual Meeting (Feb. 16, 1998) <http://
www.aaas.org/meetings/scope/breyer.htm> ("[J]udges have not often invoked their Rules-provided
authority to appoint their own experts."); Tahirih V. Lee, Court-Appointed Experts and Judicial
Reluctance: A Proposal to Amend Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
480, 494-95 (1988) ("Even with Rule 706 in place, judges rarely appoint experts."); John M. Sink, The
Unused Power of a Federal Judge to Call His Own Expert Witnesses, 29 S. CAL. L. REV. 195 (1956).
30. See, e.g., James T. Rosenbaum, Lessons from Litigation over Silicone Breast Implants: A Call for
Activism by Scientists, 276 SCIENCE 1524 (1997); The Use of Court-Appointed Scientific and Technical
Experts: Executive Summary 2-5 (Fed. Judicial Ctr. 1993) (noting infrequent use of court-appointed
scientific experts, and discussing possible reasons for judicial reluctance).
Judicial reluctance to appoint experts extends not only to scientific matters, but also to matters
requiring economic or financial expertise. The chief judge of the United States Tax Court recently
stated that despite judges' frustration with adversary expert witnesses, she "would be very reluctant to
approve a court-appointed expert not suggested or agreed to by the parties." Tax Court Chief Judge
Reluctant to Appoint Own Expert Witnesses, 66 U.S.L.W. 2106-07 (Aug. 19, 1997) (quoting Chief
Judge Mary Ann Cohen).
31. See In. re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 830 F. Supp. 686, 693 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(explaining that "(t]he work of such [court-appointed] experts is especially critical in dealing with
complex mass tort problems such as the instant case," because, among other reasons, "the number of
persons affected runs into the hundreds of thousands").
32. 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993).
33. See id. at 589 ("[U]nder the Rules the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific
testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable."); see also 1 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET
AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 13 (1997) ("Daubert
... expects judges to have a sufficient appreciation of the scientific method to make this preliminary
assessment."); KENNETH R. FOSTER & PETER W. HUBER, JUDGING SCIENCE: SCIwNTIC KNOWLEDGE AND
THE FEDERAL COURTS 252 (1997) ("Perhaps the greatest contribution of Daubert was to ... emphasize
that judges must carefully scrutinize testimony proffered by scientific experts."); 2 STEPHEN SALTZBURG
ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 1224 (1994) (describing the gatekeeper function as
requiring judges to "evaluate the proffered testimony to assure that it is at least minimally reliable").
1988
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Daubert urges judges to rely less on adversarial presentation, and to involve
themselves more actively in seeking out the truth in scientifically complex
litigation.34 In mass tort litigation, some judges have exercised this responsibil-
ity by turning to neutral scientific experts.
In the breast implant litigation, in which battles over scientific questions of
causation have been especially bitter,35 judges recently have appointed their
own experts. When Judge Jones in Oregon confronted the Daubert duty to
determine the scientific validity and thus the admissibility of plaintiffs' expert
testimony on causation, he sought the advice of a panel of scientific experts.36
First, Judge Jones appointed a medical doctor/biochemist as a special master to
help the court select a panel of unbiased and well-qualified experts. 37 With the
special master's assistance, the court appointed an epidemiologist, a rheumatolo-
gist, an immunologist-toxicologist, and a polymer chemist. 38 The panel served
the court as technical advisors "to assist in evaluating the reliability and
relevance of the scientific evidence."-39 The panel's input proved essential to the
court's decision to exclude plaintiffs' expert testimony on causation of systemic
disease, and therefore to dismiss the claims.4°
Judge Sam Pointer, handling the consolidated federal Multidistrict Litigation
(MDL) in the breast implant cases, appointed a "National Science Panel" to
assist the court in examining the scientific issues. 4 1 After seeking recommenda-
34. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93. Interestingly, although Daubert increases judges' responsibility for
scientific factfinding-a quintessentially inquisitorial activity-the judicial gatekeeping role under
Daubert can be understood as an outgrowth of the adversary system. As Professor Mirjan Dama~ka has
pointed out, judicial control over admissibility of evidence goes hand in hand not only with jury trials,
but also with adversary fact-gathering and presentation. See MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW
ADRIFT 84-86 (1997).
35. See MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND THE LAW IN THE
BREAST IMPLANT CASE 116-18, 198 (1996); James E. Rooks Jr., Book Review, TRIAL, Nov. 1996, at 80.
36. See Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 E Supp. 1387 (D. Or. 1996). Judge Jones decided on
the need for technical advisors after counsel for all sides gave the court a day-long "tutorial" on the
scientific issues in the case. See id. at 1415.
37. See id. at 1393.
38. See id.
39. Id. Because Judge Jones appointed the expert panel not to testify themselves, but rather to advise
him on the admissibility of other evidence, the Hall panel members are properly considered Rule 104
technical advisors, rather than Rule 706 expert witnesses. See id. at 1392 n.8; Joseph Sanders & D.H.
Kaye, Expert Advice on Silicone Implants: Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 37 JURIMETRICS J. 113, 116
(1997); Michael Hoenig, Court-Appointed Experts, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 13, 1997, at 3.
40. See Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1394, 1402-12. The court rejected only the claims of connective tissue
disease and other systemic illness, and allowed plaintiffs' claims of localized injury from ruptured
implants to proceed to trial. See id. at 1414. Judge Jones deferred the effective date of his ruling
pending the report of the national Rule 706 panel in the breast implant multidistrict litigation, but
emphasized that modification of his decision was unlikely. See id. at 1394-95 & n.19, 1415.
For a case reaching the opposite conclusion on the admissibility of breast implant expert testimony,
see Vasallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 428 Mass. 1, 13-15 (1998), in which the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court upheld the trial court's decision, upon reviewing the transcript of the Hall
hearing and other evidence, to admit plaintiffs' expert testimony identifying a causal link between
silicone breast implants and systemic disease.
41. Order No. 31, May 31, 1996, In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig. (No.
HeinOnline  -- 87 Geo. L.J. 1989 1998-1999
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tions from a specially appointed "Selection Panel,",42 Judge Pointer named an
epidemiologist, an immunologist, a rheumatologist, and a toxicologist to the
National Science Panel.43 He directed the panel to consider whether existing
scientific research provides a reasonable basis to conclude that silicone gel
breast implants cause connective tissue diseases or immune system dysfunction. 44
The National Science Panel issued its report in November 1998. The report,
which largely concluded that the scientific studies do not demonstrate a casual
link between silicone breast implants and systemic diseases,45 will have a
tremendous impact on the future of breast implant litigation.46 Even before the
National Science Panel issued its report, the appointment of that panel in the
MDL mattered enough to judges in other breast implant cases that several
judges cited the panel's pending report as a reason to decline motions for
summary judgment in the meantime.47 In the joint Eastern District and Southern
District of New York breast implant litigation, Judges Jack Weinstein and
Harold Baer originally appointed three special masters-a law. professor, a
lawyer-physicist, and a biologist-to advise the court on candidates for its own
panel of scientific experts,48 but then awaited the report of Judge Pointer's
CV92-P-10000-S, MDL 926) (N.D. Ala.) (order to show cause why science panel should not be
established, and appointing selection panel to recommend neutral experts); Order No. 31B, June 13,
1996 (No. CV92-P-10000-S, MDL 926) (N.D. Ala.) (confirming establishment of National Science
Panel); Order No. 31E, Oct. 31, 1996 (No. CV92-P-10000-S, MDL 926) (N.D. Ala.) (giving directions
to National Science Panel) <http://www.fjc.gov/BREIMLIT/ORDERS/orders.htm>.
42. See Order 31, May 31, 1996, In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig. (No.
CV92-P-10000-S, MDL 926) (N.D. Ala.) (appointing six members to Selection Panel to act as special
masters under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 and Federal Rule of Evidence 706, and requesting
that Selection Panel provide the court with names of "neutral, impartial persons who have the indicated
expertise" for the science panel) <http://www.fjc.gov/BREIMLIT/ORDERS/orders.htm>.
43. See Order No. 31C, Aug. 23, 1996, In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig. (No.
CV92-P-10000-S, MDL 926) (N.D. Ala.) (appointing epidemiologist, immunologist and rheumatologist
to National Science Panel); Order No. 31D, Sept. 17, 1996 (No. CV92-P-10000-S, MDL 926) (N.D.
Ala.) (appointing toxicologist to National Science Panel) <http://www.fjc.gov/BREIMLIT/ORDERS/
orders.htm>.
44. See Order No. 31E, Oct. 31, 1996, In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig. (No.
CV92-P-10000-S, MDL 926) (N.D. Ala.) <http://www.fjc.gov/BREIMLIT/ORDERS/orders.htm>.
45. See Report of the National Science Panel (Nov. 30, 1998) <http://www.fjc.gov/BREIMLIT/
SCIENCE/report.htm>.
46. In the wake of the National Science Panel's report, Professor Michael Green was quoted as
saying, "It will be hard to find a Federal judge who will permit a case to be tried or who will sustain on
post-trial motions a plaintiff's claims to systemic disease." Kolata, supra note 4, at A14.
47. See In re Dow Coming Corp., 215 BR. 526, 527 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997); In re Breast Implant
Cases, 942 F. Supp. 958, 959 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1996); see also Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F.
Supp. 1387, 1394-95, 1415 (D. Or. 1996) (deferring effective date of decision excluding plaintiffs'
experts pending report of national Rule 706 panel); Vasallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 428 Mass. 1, 15
(1998) (pointing out that national panel is trying "to arrive at a consensus concerning the admissibility
of expert testimony of the type involved in this case," and that "[t]he report of this rule 706 panel may
resolve the controversy surrounding claims of atypical connective tissue disease related to silicone
breast implants").
48. See Joint Order No. 1, In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig. (E.D.N.Y. 96-BI-1
S.D.N.Y. 91-CV-6996 et al.) (Apr. 3, 1996); Sanders & Kaye, supra note 39, at 115 & n.12; Mark
Hansen, Panel to Examine Implant Evidence, 82 A.B.A. J., June 1996, at 34.
1990
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science panel.49
Most notably, anticipation of the National Science Panel's report appears to
have been a driving force behind the $3.2 billion settlement tentatively reached
in 1998 by the Dow Coming Corporation and plaintiffs' lawyers, under the
auspices of the bankruptcy court supervising Dow Coming's Chapter 11 reor-
ganization. 50 Although not everyone views the breast implant settlement as a
mass tort success story,51 Judge Pointer should be credited with creating a fer-
tile and appropriate environment for settlement negotiations.52 In litigation
that turns on a disputed scientific question of causation, a settlement reached
under the pressure of an impending report by a credible independent panel of
scientists likely reflects a more legitimate settlement value than a settlement
reached under the pressure of adversary expert battles and accumulating jury
verdicts.
The developing use of court-appointed experts in mass torts is not limited to
breast implant cases. In the asbestos litigation, Judge Weinstein and Bankruptcy
Judge Burton Lifland used a panel of court-appointed scientific experts to report
on the future course of asbestos claims.53 The three researchers on the panel
49. See In re Breast Implant Cases, 942 F. Supp. 958, 960-61 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1996). With support
from Judges Weinstein and Baer, Judge Pointer named the three New York special masters to the MDL
Selection Panel. See Order No. 31, May 31, 1996, In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig.
(No. CV92-P-10000-S, MDL 926) (N.D. Ala.) (appointing Prof. Margaret Berger, Dr. Joel Cohen, and
Dr. Alan Wolf to Selection Panel "after consulting with, and receiving encouragement from, Judges
Baer, Jones, and Weinstein, as well as other state and federal judges") <http://www.fjc.gov/BREIMLIT/
ORDERS/orders.htm>.
50. See Order Regarding Term Sheet, Scheduling Hearing Date and Re-Appointing Mediator, In re
Dow Coming Corp. (Bankr. E.D. Mich. July 8, 1998) (No. 20612) (setting forth procedures following
receipt of letters from Dow Coming, the Official Committee of Tort Claimants, Dow Chemical
Company, and Coming Incorporated informing the court that they had accepted the provisions of a term
sheet providing $3.2 billion for settlement). On the relevance of the National Science Panel to the deal,
see David J. Morrow, Implant Maker Reaches Accord on Damage Suits, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1998, at Al
(noting the comment of a participant in the negotiations that the anticipated expert report pressured both
sides toward settlement because neither side wanted to risk damage from an unfavorable report).
51. See Daniel McGinn & Karen Springen, Dow Coming's Breast-Implant Settlement Was a Victory
for Junk Science-Maybe One of the Last, NEWSWEEK, July 20, 1998, at 53 (reporting that neither the
bankrupt defendant nor women's advocates celebrate the settlement, and quoting one observer as
saying, "I don't see victory in this settlement for women, for the public or for scientific truth.").
52. Rule 706 was intended, in part, to allow courts to use impartial experts to promote settlement.
See MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EvIDENCE § 706.1, at 176 & n.5 (4th ed. 1996); see
also CHARLES A. WRIGHT & VICTOR J. GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PRocEDuRE: EVIDENCE § 6302, at
454 (1997) (stating that a court-appointed expert "provides the parties themselves with reason to
moderate their views and move toward settlement"). But see Ellen Relkin, Some Implications of
Daubert and Its Potential for Misuse: Misapplication to Environmental Tort Cases and Abuse of Rule
706(a) Court-Appointed Experts, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 2255, 2268-69 (1994) (contending that use of
court-appointed experts does not facilitate settlement).
53. See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 830 F. Supp. 686, 693 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(discussing report of Rule 706 panel of scientific experts estimating future asbestos claims, and noting
that "[t]he work of such experts is especially critical in dealing with complex mass tort problems such
as the instant case."); In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 151 F.R.D. 540, 545-46 (E. & S.D.N.Y.
1993) (denying plaintiffs' motion to depose members of the Rule 706 panel).
1999] 1991
HeinOnline  -- 87 Geo. L.J. 1991 1998-1999
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 87:1983
worked in consultation with two medical school professors.54 Judge Carl Rubin
used court-appointed medical experts in a number of asbestos cases to testify
regarding whether the plaintiffs had asbestosis or pleural plaque.55 Court-
appointed experts have appeared also in the massive products liability litigation
against manufacturer A.H. Robins for injuries caused by the Dalkon Shield
contraceptive device.5 6
Courts have appointed scientific experts in other mass tort cases as well. In
the Bendectin litigation, Michigan state court judge Susan Borman granted
summary judgment for the defendant based on the causation testimony of four
court-appointed medical experts.57 In an environmental toxic tort case against
the Martin Marietta Corporation, a federal judge similarly granted summary
judgment for the defendant based on the testimony of three court-appointed
experts: a geochemist, a physician, and a toxicologist.58 Despite the general
reluctance of courts to appoint their own experts, the recent use of such experts
in a number of different mass tort cases suggests that at least in scientifically
complex mass tort litigation, an increasing number of judges appreciate the
need to move beyond adversary experts.59
As judges handling mass tort litigation have overcome reluctance to appoint
experts, offers of help and words of encouragement have come from various
sources. 60 The American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)
54. See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 151 F.R.D. at 542.
55. See Carl B. Rubin & Laura Ringenbach, The Use of Court Experts in Asbestos Litigation, 137
F.R.D. 35, 37 (1991) (reporting on the use of court-appointed medical experts in 65 asbestos cases in
the Southern District of Ohio, and advocating judicious use of such experts).
56. See Glasser v. A.H. Robins Co. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 950 F.2d 147, 147 (4th Cir.
1991); In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 694, 698-99 (4th Cir. 1989); In re A.H. Robins Co., 830 F.
Supp. 686, 689-90 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1993); In re A.H. Robins Co., 129 B.R. 710 (1991).
57. See DePyper v. Navarro, No. 83-303467-NM, 1995 WL 788828, at *2 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Nov. 27,
1995); see also DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 911 E2d 941, 956 n.17 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting
acceptability of using court-appointed expert in Bendectin case).
58. See Renaud v. Martin Marietta Corp., 749 F. Supp. 1545, 1548 (D. Colo. 1990), afftd, 972 F.2d
304 (10th Cir. 1992); see also In re Repetitive Stress Injury Litig., 142 F.R.D. 584, 587 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)
(consolidating all Eastern District of New York repetitive stress injury cases, in part to facilitate use of
court-appointed scientific experts), vacated on other grounds, 11 F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 1993); Mediger v.
Liquid Air Corp., 926 F. Supp. 152 (D. Or. 1995) (granting summary judgment for product liability
defendant after hearing testimony of court-appointed chemistry expert).
Although the most prominent uses of court-appointed scientific experts have resulted in favorable
rulings for defendants, Rule 706 should not be considered solely a defendant's tool. For cases in which
independent expert testimony has led to plaintiff victories, see In re Complaint of the F/V Capt. Wool,
Inc., 914 F Supp. 1300 (E.D. Va. 1995); Doe v. Dolton Elementary Sch., 694 F. Supp. 440, 442 (N.D.
Ill. 1988); Letoski v. United States, 488 F. Supp. 952, 960 (M.D. Pa. 1979).
59. On court-appointed scientific experts, see generally Cecil & Willging, supra note 25; Joe S.
Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Court-Appointed Experts, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCtENTIFIC Ev1-
DENCE 525-73 (Federal Judicial Center 1994); Paul S. Miller & Bert W. Rein, Science and Courts Still
Struggle to Cooperate, NAT'L L.J., May 12, 1997, at A22.
60. Momentum began building in the early 1990s. A committee of lawyers and scientists formed
jointly by the American Bar Association and the American Association for the Advancement of Science
submitted a report in 1991 proposing ways to increase use of court-appointed experts. See AAAS-ABA
National Conference of Lawyers and Scientists Task Force on Science and Technology in the Courts,
1992
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established a pilot project to help courts find capable scientists to use as
independent expert witnesses or as technical advisors.61 Justice Stephen G.
Breyer, in a speech to the AAAS, praised that pilot project, and spoke positively
about the use of scientific court-appointed experts and technical advisors.62
Critics of court-appointed experts raise concerns that such experts wield
enormous power over the outcome of cases, because court-appointed experts
bear an official stamp of approval.63 An expert labeled "independent" or"neutral" cannot be demystified on cross-examination as readily as an expert
retained by a party. To the extent this reflects a real difference in reliability
between court-appointed experts and party-retained ones, it should be no cause
for concern. The credibility that comes with "independence," however, presents
a risk that some trial judges may try to invade the jury's province,64 and to
evade appellate review of judgment as a matter of law. Suppose a judge favors
either plaintiff or defendant, and would like to take the case away from the jury
by granting judgment as a matter of law,6 5 but fears reversal because the
evidence is not one-sided enough to support such a ruling. The judge might
appoint an expert whom the judge has reason to believe will opine as the judge
Enhancing the Availability of Reliable and Impartial Scientific and Technical Expertise to the Federal
Courts (1991). A Carnegie Commission task force followed up with a report in 1993 on enhancing
judicial handling of scientific issues. See CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND
GOVERNMENT, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 37 (1993) (suggesting, among
other things, ways to increase use of court-appointed experts). The Carnegie Commission task force
also worked with the Federal Judicial Center to produce the Center's 1994 Reference Manual on
Scientific Evidence, which contains a substantial section on court-appointed experts.
61. See American Association for the Advancement of Science, Use of Scientific and Technical
Information in the Courts (visited Nov. 11, 1998) <http://www.aaas.org/spp/dspp/sfrl/projects/
courts.htm> (describing 1991 task force report, 1993 planning conference, and current design of
"demonstration project that will allow AAAS to serve as the link between the courts and the
scientific/technical communities"); see also ANGELL, supra note 35, at 205 (urging judges to appoint
expert witnesses rather than relying on parties' experts, and suggesting that "[rieputable experts could
be recommended to courts by established scientific organizations, such as the National Academy of
Sciences or the American Association for the Advancement of Science").
62. See Stephen G. Breyer, The Interdependence of Science and Law, Address at the 1998 AAAS
Annual Meeting (Feb. 16, 1998) <http://www.aaas.org/meetings/scope/breyer.htm>; see also General
Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring) (approvingly quoting amicus brief of
New England Journal of Medicine urging judges to appoint scientific experts to help courts fulfill their
gatekeeping function under Daubert); Maritime Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 414-15 (Tex.
1998) (Gonzalez, J., concurring) (encouraging judges to, "in complex litigation, appoint a panel of
specially trained scientists or a special master to hear evidence and report on complicated scientific and
statistical matters").
63. See, e.g., Relkin, supra note 52, at 2262-69; see also FED. R. EvtD. 706 advisory committee's
note (1972) (acknowledging argument "that court appointed experts acquire an aura of infallibility to
which they are not entitled"); GRAHAM, supra note 52, § 706.1, at 180 (noting that use of Rule 706 can
"foster excessive emphasis by the trier of fact on this witness's opinion at the expense of the adversary
system"). This concern is most pronounced in jury trials in which the jury is informed of the expert's
court-appointed status. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
64. See Relkin, supra note 52, at 2264 (arguing that use of Rule 706 can result in abrogation of
Seventh Amendment right to jury trial).
65. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50 (judgment as a matter of law at trial, before or after verdict); FED. R. Civ.
P. 56 (summary judgment).
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favors,6 6 knowing that the "independent" expert's opinion will hold huge sway
with the jury. By leaving the decision to the jury, while practically controlling it
through expert appointment, the judge largely insulates the outcome from
reversal.
The concern is legitimate, but answerable. In practice, courts often use their
own scientific experts not to testify to a jury, but rather to advise the court on
such matters as the admissibility of other scientific evidence.67 This was pre-
cisely how Judge Jones used his expert panel in the Hall breast implant case.68
When judges use experts to advise the court rather than to testify as witnesses,
the court remains fully accountable for legal decisions on appellate review. It is
worth emphasizing that even when the court-appointed expert witness testifies
to a jury, the expert is subject to cross-examination, 69 and the parties remain
free to call their own expert witnesses. 70 The jury need not be informed that the
testifying expert was appointed by the court, although in most cases the jury is
so informed. 71 Finally, although the risk of misuse of court-appointed experts by
unscrupulous judges persists, many courts have used selection processes that
protect the legitimacy of the endeavor.72
In a case where the stakes are low, it may make little sense to impose
additional litigation costs on the parties or taxpayers by appointing experts to
supplement those retained by the parties.7 3 But where the stakes are high, the
scientific dispute central, and the public interest great-as in much mass tort
66. See WIGrr & GOLD, supra note 52, § 6302, at 456 & n.17 (noting concern that court-appointed
expert "may also reflect the biases of the judge"); Relkin, supra note 52, at 2265 (arguing that selection
of expert can predetermine expert's opinion, and thus be tantamount to answering the question in
dispute).
67. See supra notes 24 and 39 (distinguishing between technical advisors and Rule 706 expert
witnesses).
68. See Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Or. 1996); see also supra text
accompanying notes 36-40.
69. See FED. R. EvID. 706(a) ("The [court-appointed expert] witness shall be subject to cross-
examination by each party, including a party calling the witness.").
70. See FED. R. EvtD. 706(d) ("Nothing in this rule limits the parties in calling expert witnesses of
their own selection.").
71. See FED. R. EvD. 706(c) (giving the court discretionary power to "authorize disclosure to the
jury of the fact that the court appointed the expert witness"); WIGTrr & GoLD, supra note 52, § 6305,
at 481-83 (noting controversy over Rule 706(c), and further noting that in most cases the jury is
informed of the expert's court-appointed status).
72. See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S.D.N.Y. Asbestos Litig., 151 F.R.D. 540, 542 (E. & S.D.N.Y. &
Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1993) (appointing law professor to assist in selection of experts); Fund for Animals,
Inc. v. Florida Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm'n, 550 F. Supp. 1206, 1208 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (using
Rule 706 panel of experts nominated by the parties); Leesona Corp. v. Varta Batteries, Inc., 522 F
Supp. 1304, 1310-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (using Rule 706 electrochemistry expert who appeared on both
parties' lists of nominees); supra text accompanying notes 37-38 (discussing Judge Jones's use of
special master to screen potential appointees in Hall breast implant case); supra text accompanying
notes 42-43 (discussing Judge Pointer's use of panel to select scientific experts in breast implant MDL).
73. See, e.g., Gold v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, No. B-82-383 (EBB), 1998 WL 351466 *2 (D.
Conn. June 3, 1998) (noting cost issues as a reason not to appoint Rule 706 experts in an individual
lawsuit against the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust).
1994
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litigation 74 -it is difficult to justify the failure to employ independent experts.
II. INQUISITORIAL EXPLORATION OF THE MERITS: SETTLEMENT CLASS ACTIONS
"Settlement class actions" are becoming a dominant form of dispute resolu-
tion for mass torts.. Because such class actions demand particularly intense and
skeptical judicial inquiry into the merits of proposed settlements, their effective
use depends on the court's willingness to adopt an inquisitorial approach. Other
than judicial scrutiny of the settlement, there is nothing inherently inquisitorial
about settlement class actions. Class actions, after all, are largely unknown in
the civil law inquisitorial systems. The settlement class action fairness inquiry,
however, must be undertaken with a level of independent judicial scrutiny-and
an unwillingness to rely solely on the litigants' presentations-that is strongly
suggestive of inquisitorial justice.7 6
74. Although on one level it can be viewed simply as an accumulation of private tort cases, mass tort
litigation has been described aptly as a species of "public law litigation." See, e.g., JACK B. WEINSTEIN,
INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION 41 (1995); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in
Mass Tort Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARv. L. REv. 849 (1984).
See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1281
(1976) (introducing concept of "public law litigation" and describing its characteristic features).
75. See KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KoTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 17 (2d ed. 1987);
Richard B. Cappalli & Claudio Consolo, Class Actions for Continental Europe? A Preliminary Inquiry,
6 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 217, 233 (1992).
76. See infra text accompanying notes 111-133 (on judicial inquiry in settlement class actions); infra
text accompanying notes 133-66 (on inquisitorial justice systems).
In drawing a parallel between settlement class actions and inquisitorial systems, I do not mean to
suggest that settlement class actions lack adversarial aspects. There remains an adversarial tone in any
settlement class action where objectors appear in opposition to the settlement. Fairness hearings in mass
tort settlement class actions typically include arguments by such objectors, and can take on the
appearance of an adversary proceeding between zealous supporters of the settlement and equally
zealous objectors. See JAY H. TIDMARSH, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MASS TORT SETILEMENT CLASS
ACTIONS: FIVE CASE STUDIES 49-51, 62-63 (1998) (describing objectors' role in the Amchem and Ortiz
settlement class actions); Robert B. Gerard & Scott A. Johnson, The Role of the Objector in Class
Action Settlements-A Case Study of the General Motors Truck "Side Saddle" Fuel Tank Litigation, 31
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 409 (1998) (describing objectors' role in the General Motors Pickup Truck settlement
class action); see also THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 57 (1996) (among class actions overall, "about half
of the settlements that were the subject of a hearing generated at least one objection," although most
objections were in writing rather than through appearance at the hearing).
The possibility of zealous objectors does not alter the fundamentally inquisitorial nature of such
hearings. A class action judge is obligated to consider whether a settlement should be approved,
whether or not anyone argues in opposition to it. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(e); see also FED. R. Clv. P.
23(e) (proposed) advisory committee's note (1996) (urging a fairness hearing even if no party or
objector has requested it); Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem
Prods., Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1126-27 (1995) (explaining that the presence of objectors
challenging a settlement "does not transform a fairness proceeding into an ordinary adversary proceed-
ing" because, among other reasons, objectors generally are not permitted extensive discovery). More-
over, just as settlement class actions present a risk that class counsel will accept an unfair class
settlement in exchange for favorable settlements on inventory claims, see infra text accompanying
notes 114-15, so can vocal objectors be bought off through side deals to settle with the objectors'
clients on favorable terms, or by amending the settlement to satisfy particular objectors while leaving
uncured more fundamental fairness problems with the settlement. See Gerard & Johnson, supra, at 417.
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First, the terminology. Often, when plaintiffs pursue a class action toward
trial, at some point they reach a settlement with the defendants. If approved by
the court,7 7 this will achieve a class action settlement. That is not what I am
referring to as a "settlement class action." Rather, a "settlement class action"
results from settlement negotiations completed before the court rules on class
certification.
In a number of mass tort cases, plaintiffs' counsel have reached settlements
with defendants on a class action basis before the class has been certified (and
often before the complaint has been filed). The parties then jointly move for
class certification and simultaneously seek approval of the settlement. In such
situations, the class certification motion and settlement are conditionally interde-
pendent. The parties seek class certification solely for purposes of the settle-
ment, not for litigation, and they agree to the settlement solely on condition that
the class is certified.
It is easy to see why many courts have been willing to approve such
settlements. All parties seemingly win. The court disposes of enormous, burden-
some litigation on a basis that appears to satisfy both sides. The plaintiffs'
lawyers obtain compensation for their clients, and preserve their own class
action franchise and the resultant fees that go with it. The defendant gains
protection from further liability, because a class action settlement binds all class
members.78 The Manual for Complex Litigation (Third) approves of settlement
classes, noting among other benefits that "[t]he costs of litigating class certifica-
tion are saved and litigation expense is generally reduced by an early settle-
ment." 79
Settlement class actions were virtually unheard of fifteen years ago. 80 After
several uses of settlement class actions outside the mass tort arena,8' mass tort
litigants began using the device in the mid-1980s,82 and the approach caught on
Finally, "inquisitorial" need not mean "nonadversarial." A vigorous judicial inquiry into the merits
of a settlement class action reflects inquisitorial judging despite the presence of zealous objectors, just
as reliance on court-appointed experts reflects inquisitorial judging despite the zealousness of the
adversary parties.
77. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (requiring court approval for settlement of class action).
78. If the class action is brought under Rule 23(b)(3), class members may avoid being bound by
opting out. See FED. R. Ctv. P. 23(c)(2).
79. M.C.L.3d, supra note 23, § 30.45.
80. See TtDMARSH, supra note 76, at 21-22. Although the settlement class action emerged only
recently, Professor Stephen Yeazell makes the interesting observation that in one sense the settlement
class returns group litigation to its medieval roots, as a device that can be used either by or against
groups of relatively powerless persons. See Stephen C. Yeazell, The Past and Future of Defendant and
Settlement Classes in Collective Litigation, 39 ARiz. L. REV. 687, 700-04 (1997).
81. See Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1982) (securities); In re Beef Indus. Antitrust
Litig., 607 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1979) (antitrust).
82. See In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1984) (rejecting Rule 23(b)(1)
settlement class action in Bendectin litigation); Hagood v. Olin Corp., No. CV-83-C-5917-NE (N.D.
Ala. 1986) (unpublished) (described in Francis E. McGovern & E. Allan Lind, The Discovery Survey,
51 LAw & CorrrEmp. PROBs. 41, 42-49 (1988) and in TiuaARsH, supra note 76, at 22) (certifying Rule
23(b)(3) settlement class action of toxic tort claims against Olin Corporation, arising out of exposure to
1996 [Vol. 87:1983
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quickly. 83 As the Supreme Court noted in 1997, "Among current applications of
Rule 23(b)(3), the 'settlement-only' class has become a stock device."' 84 Settle-
ment class actions have proved particularly useful in mass product liability
litigation. Although several mass product liability settlement class actions have
been overturned on appeal,85 many others have stuck.86
The Supreme Court declined an opportunity to close the door on settlement
class actions in Amchem Products v. Windsor.87 The Third Circuit, in an opinion
by Judge Edward Becker that received much attention among mass tort practitio-
ners, held that a class action could not be certified for settlement unless it could
also be certified for trial.88 Because of the trial management problems presented
by mass tort class actions, the Third Circuit's holding, if upheld, could have
rendered many mass tort settlement class actions uncertifiable.89
the pesticide DDT). See generally TIDMARSH, supra note 76, at 20-24 (summarizing history of mass tort
settlement class actions).
83. See WILLGING Er AL., supra note 76, at 34-35. The Federal Judicial Center study found that of
152 certified class actions within the sample, 59 cases (39% of the certified class actions) were certified
for settlement purposes only. Of those 59 cases, 28 (18% of the certified class actions) contained docket
entries or other information indicating that a proposed settlement was submitted before or simulta-
neously with the first motion to certify. See id. at 35. Whether the 39% or 18% figure better represents
the frequency of "settlement class actions," it is clear from the Federal Judicial Center data that
settlement class actions comprise a significant portion of the class action activity in federal courts.
84. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 618 (1997).
85. See Amchem, 521 U.S. 591 (overturning asbestos settlement class action for failure to meet Rule
23 requirements, including adequacy of representation and Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement);
In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995)
(overturning pickup truck settlement class action on Third Circuit's reasoning-now rejected by
Amchem-that a class cannot be certified for settlement unless it could also be certified for litigation);
In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1984) (using writ of mandamus to vacate
certification of Bendectin settlement class action on grounds that the facts did not fit Rule 23(b)(1)).
86. See Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 1998) (defective minivan rear liftgate
latches); In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prod. Liab. Litig., 176 F.R.D. 158 (E.D. Pa. 1997); Final Order
and Judgment Relating to Settlement, In re Factor VI or IX Concentrate Blood Prods. Litig. (No.
93-C-7452) (N.D. Ill. May 8, 1996); Garza v. Sporting Goods Properties, Inc., No. Civ. A. 5A-93-CA-
108, 1996 WL 56247 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 1996) (economic loss caused by defective shotguns); Bowling
v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141 (S.D. Ohio 1992), appeal dismissed, 14 F.3d 600 (6th Cir. 1993)
(Bjork-Shiley heart valve); In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989) (Dalkon Shield); White
v. General Motors Corp., 718 So. 2d 480 (La. App. 1998) (pickup trucks); Dunk v. Ford Motor Co., 56
Cal. Rptr. 2d 483 (Cal. App. 1996) (defective car door); Cox v. Shell Oil Co., Civ. A. No. 18844, 1995
WL 775363 (Tenn. Ch. Nov. 17, 1995) (property damage from defective polybutylene plumbing
systems); see also Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp., 162 F.R.D. 505 (E.D. Tex. 1995), affd, 90 F.3d 963 (5th
Cir. 1996), vacated and remanded, 117 S. Ct. 2503 (1997), reaffd, 134 F.3d 668 (5th Cir. 1998), cert.
granted sub nom. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., No. 97-1704, 1998 WL 185212 (June 22, 1998) (Rule
23(b)(I)(B) "limited fund" asbestos settlement class action reaffirmed by Fifth Circuit notwithstanding
the Supreme Court's decision in Amchem, but now under reconsideration by the Supreme Court). Cf.
Richard B. Schmitt, Brooke 's Liggett Unit Seeks to Revive Accord Eliminating Suits by Smokers, WALL
ST. J., July 21, 1998, at B 17 (reporting on settlement class action filed by tobacco plaintiffs and tobacco
defendant Liggett Group, seeking court approval).
87. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
88. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 626 (3d Cir. 1996).
89. Manageability matters because class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) requires that the court find
"that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy," and includes among pertinent considerations "the difficulties likely to be encountered in
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Although the Supreme Court affirmed on other grounds the Third Circuit's
reversal of class certification, the Court explicitly rejected the Third Circuit's
holding that a settlement class certification decision must be treated the same as
a litigation class certification decision, stating, "settlement is relevant to a class
certification." 90 Specifically, settlement can facilitate class certification because
it solves the concern of trial unmanageability. 9' Justice Breyer, in partial
dissent, agreed with the majority's approval of settlement class actions.92 Some
lawyers have construed Amchem as rejecting settlement class actions, or as
requiring that any settlement class action be certifiable as well for trial; 93 their
reading is plainly incorrect.94
Just as the Supreme Court avoided rejecting settlement class actions generally
even as it rejected this particular settlement class action, the Court also avoided
the management of a class action." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); see, e.g., Castano v. American Tobacco
Co., 84 E3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996) (decertifying enormous tobacco litigation class action under Rule
23(b)(3), in significant part because of concerns of trial unmanageability); see also TDMARSH, supra
note 77, at 10 (noting that the Amchem, Ortiz, and breast implant settlement class actions would have
presented significant problems of pretrial, trial and remedial management if they were to be litigated
rather than settled).
90. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 619.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 629 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
93. One commentator, for example, misread Amchem as follows:
Previously, a defendant could agree to a proposed class action settlement, while reserving the
right to challenge the propriety of classwide litigation if the settlement was not approved. But
the Supreme Court has now foreclosed this option-there must be a judicial finding that the
lawsuit meets the Rule 23 standards for litigation as a class action. A defendant who agrees to
a classwide settlement under Amchem's rigorous standards now must admit (or be prepared to
accept a finding) that the lawsuit could be tried as a class action as well.
Brian Anderson, Will Supreme Court Ruling Ebb the Class Action Tide?, 1997 ANDREws AuToMoTIVE
LMG. RaP. 25461. Others have made the same error:
Other courts of appeals, notably the Third Circuit, have held that a class cannot be certified
for settlement unless certification for trial is warranted-that is, unless Rule 23(a) and (b) are
satisfied. In Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, the United States Supreme Court sided with
the Third Circuit.
Gerard & Johnson, supra note 76, at 413. The confusion may result from some observers' failure to
reconcile the Supreme Court's insistence that any settlement class action meet the requirements of Rule
23(a) and (b), with the Court's acknowledgement that Rule 23's requirements sometimes may be met
for settlement even if they are not met for trial.
94. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 619-21. In a similar vein, some media reports wrongly spun the
Amchem decision as a death knell for settlement class actions. See, e.g., Christopher Drew, Ruling
Could Jeopardize Class-Action Settlements, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1997, at D2; Marianne Lavelle, Court
Rejects Settlement Class Actions, NAT'L L.J., July 7, 1997, at B 1. The Court's opinion clearly left open
the possibility of mass tort settlement class actions, as long as the classes are defined with care to
ensure adequate representation, see Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623, 628, and post-Amchem settlement class
actions have borne that out. See infra text accompanying notes 99-103. Other commentators, however,
probably overstated the case by suggesting that Amchem not only does not preclude settlement class
actions, but facilitates them. See Herbert E. Milstein & Gary E. Mason, The Reaction to Class Action,
149 N.J.L.J. 624, 625 (1997) ("[Amchem] will make certification of settlement classes more likely by
assuring that the courts will consider the settlement itself as a factor in determining the propriety of
certification.").
1998
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rejecting mass tort class actions generally even as it rejected this particular mass
tort class action. Citing the influential 1966 Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
note, Justice Ginsburg made it clear that Amchem should be taken neither as
encouragement for mass tort class actions nor as a prohibition:
Even mass tort cases arising from a common cause or disaster may, depending
upon the circumstances, satisfy the predominance requirement. The Advisory
Committee for the 1966 revision of Rule 23, it is true, noted that "mass
accident" cases are likely to present "significant questions, not only of
damages but of liability and defenses of liability, ... affecting the individuals
in different ways." And the Committee advised that such cases are "ordinarily
not appropriate" for class treatment. But the text of the rule does not categori-
cally exclude mass torts cases from class certification, and district courts,
since the late 1970s, have been certifying such cases in increasing number.
The Committee's warning, however, continues to call for caution when
individual stakes are high and disparities among class members great.95
What is clear from the Supreme Court's rejection of the Amchem settlement
class action is this: if parties want to use settlement class actions to resolve mass
torts, they must avoid predominance problems 96 by defining classes and sub-
classes with precision, and they must avoid adequacy of representation prob-
lems97 by ensuring that groups with divergent interests, such as present and
future claimants, are represented by separate counsel.9 8
Since Amchem, settlement class actions have remained a viable approach to
resolving mass tort litigation. After the Supreme Court remanded the Ortiz
asbestos settlement class action for reconsideration in light of Amchem, 99 the
95. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625.
96. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3).
97. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
98. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623-27; see also Judith Resnik, Postscript: The Import of Amchem
Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 30 U.C. DAVis L. REv. 881, 884 (1997) ("Amchem directs district judges to
insist that members of classes be linked in a variety of ways other than sharing in a settlement, to be
leery of mass-tort aggregates with widely varying degrees of injury and differing forms of exposure,
and to search for means of creating subclasses when possible.").
For an example of a settlement class action approved under Amchem because the class was defined
with precision to avoid intra-class conflicts, see Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1021 (9th
Cir. 1998) (affirming Rule 23(b)(3) settlement class action of claims for defective minivan liftgate
latches, noting that in contrast to the Amchem class, this class was "narrowly circumscribed").
Experienced class action litigators are endeavoring to redefine and subdivide otherwise unacceptable
settlement class actions to satisfy the Supreme Court's requirements. After the Liggett Group's tobacco
settlement class action was rejected following Amchem by a West Virginia federal court, see Walker v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 226 (S.D. W. Va. 1997), Liggett and a group of plaintiffs' lawyers
pursued a revised settlement class action in Alabama state court that, according to one report, attempts
to address the Amchem concerns. See Schmitt, supra note 86. Among other things, the revised Liggett
settlement class action divides the plaintiffs into subclasses to give separate legal representation to
current and future claimants. See id.
99. See Flanagan v. Ahearn, 117 S. Ct. 2503 (1997) (mem.) and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 117 S. Ct.
2503 (1997) (mem.), vacating In re Asbestos Litig., 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996).
1999] 1999
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Fifth Circuit reaffirmed its approval of the class action in a short per curiam
opinion, asserting that the reasoning of Amchem does not apply to a Rule
23(b)(1)(B) class action such as Ortiz.' ° In the orthopedic bone screw product
liability litigation, a federal court approved a settlement-only Rule 23(b)(1)(B)
class action several months after the Amchem decision.'l ' A Rule 23(b)(3)
settlement class action concerning defective minivan latches received approval
by the Ninth Circuit using a careful analysis of the Supreme Court's Amchem
guidelines.' 0 2 Another post-Amchem mass tort settlement class action received
preliminary approval in a case involving claims by families of cancer patients
subjected to clandestine radiation testing in the late 1960s.10 3 Settlement class
actions remain viable outside the mass tort area, as well.' °4 Nevertheless, by
demanding greater class and subclass precision, Amchem has made it more
difficult to use settlement class actions to resolve such sprawling mass tort
matters as the tobacco litigation.10 5
To whatever extent Amchem may make certain class actions more difficult in
federal court, some parties will take their class actions to state court.10 6 In
100. See In re Asbestos Litig., 134 F.3d 668 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. granted sub nom. Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp., 118 S. Ct. 2339 (1998).
101. See In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prod. Liab. Litig., 176 F.R.D. 158 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
102. See Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 1998).
103. See In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., No. C-1-94-126, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12960 (S.D.
Ohio Aug. 4, 1997) (initially rejecting proposed settlement class action); Class Action Settlement
Approved by Judge in Cincinnati Radiation Case, MEALEY's EMERGING Toxic TORTS, Nov. 21, 1997, at
15 (discussing subsequent preliminary approval of settlement class action); Consent Decrees Signed in
Cincinnati Radiation Case, MEALEY'S LMG. RPTR., Apr. 24, 1998 (discussing implementation of
injunctive portion of settlement).
104. See, e.g., In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1998)
(upholding certification of Rule 23(b)(3) settlement class action involving claims of deceptive sales
practices), cert. denied, 1999 WL 16241 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1999); Thomas v. Albright, 139 F.3d 227 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (upholding certification of Rule 23(b)(2) settlement class action involving discrimination
claims under Title VII); Neff v. VIA Metro. Transit Auth., 179 F.R.D. 185 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (certifying
Rule 23(b)(2) settlement class action involving claims for public transportation access under the
Americans with Disabilities Act); Elkins v. Equitable Life Ins., No. Civ. A96-29b-Civ-T-17B, 1998 WL
133741 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 27, 1998) (certifying Rule 23(b)(3) settlement class action involving claims of
unfair and misleading sales practices); In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy Litig., 175 F.R.D.
202 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (certifying Rule 23(b)(l)(B) securities fraud settlement class action); White v.
General Motors Corp., 718 So. 2d 480 (La. App. 1998) (upholding certification of state court products
liability settlement class action under Louisiana's Code of Civil Procedure).
105. See Walker v. Liggett, 175 F.R.D. 226 (S.D. W. Va. 1997) (rejecting proposed settlement class
action of tobacco claims, finding the class too broad and diverse to permit certification under Amchem).
106. See Conference Report: High Court's Amchem Ruling Raises Issues on Scope of Class
Settlements, Panelists Say, 66 U.S.L.W. 2122 (Aug. 26, 1997) (reporting prediction of leading class
action lawyers John Aldock and Sheila Birnbaum that "Amchem will accelerate the trend of bringing
class actions in state courts"); Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Life After Amchem: The Class Struggle Continues,
31 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 373, 386-94 (1998) (discussing migration of class actions from federal to state
court); Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Recent Developments in Nationwide Products Liability Litigation, SC33
ALI-ABA 1, 27 (1998) ("it is reasonable to predict that the trend toward increased multi-state product
liability activity in the state courts will continue" as plaintiffs react to federal resistance to nationwide
class actions); John C. Coffee Jr., After the High Court Decision in Amchem Products Inc. v. Windsor,
Can a Class Action Ever Be Certified Only for the Purpose of Settlement?, NAT'L L.J., July 21, 1997, at
B4 ("The migration of class actions to state courts, which began in the wake of the Private Securities
2000
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current class action litigation in which plaintiffs seek class certification and
defendants oppose it, following the forum feels rather like watching a tennis
match. Plaintiffs file their class action in state court. Defendants remove to
federal court. Plaintiffs move to remand to state court, arguing that the federal
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction or that removal was otherwise im-
proper. 107
In 1996, the federal Advisory Committee on Civil Rules circulated a proposal
to create a Rule 23(b)(4) category for settlement class actions. 10 8 The Commit-
tee intended the rule to override the Third Circuit's position that under Rule 23,
a class action cannot be certified for settlement unless it could also be certified
for litigation.' 0 9 In the wake of Amchem, the Advisory Committee has not
pursued that provision, because the Supreme Court's rejection of the Third
Circuit interpretation rendered the proposed rule change unnecessary. With or
without their own subsection of the federal rules, settlement class actions
present a significant, developing approach to resolving mass torts.
Unlike with most other settlements, a court in a settlement class action must
undertake a searching inquiry into the merits. Most nonclass litigation requires
no court inquiry whatsoever into the substantive propriety of a settlement. If
litigants reach a negotiated settlement, they simply memorialize their settlement
in a written agreement providing for the release of claims, and they stipulate to
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, is also likely to accelerate after Amchem."); Judith Resnik, Litigating
and Settling Class Actions: The Prerequisites of Entry and Exit, 30 U.C. DAViS L. REv. 835, 842-43
(1997).
Perhaps the most prominent example is the tobacco litigation, where plaintiffs' lawyers turned to
state court class actions after their federal class action was decertified by the Fifth Circuit in Castano v.
American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996). See Claudia MacLachlan, New Tobacco Class
Actions Gearing Up, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 16, 1996, at BI (reporting on state court tobacco litigation class
actions after Castano); Schmitt, supra note 84, at B17 (reporting on revised 1998 Liggett tobacco
settlement class action filed in Alabama state court after 1997 rejection by federal court). For an
example of a mass tort settlement class action that was disapproved by a federal court, only to be
approved later by a state court, compare In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods.
Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995) (rejecting proposed nationwide settlement class action under
Rule 23) with White v. General Motors Corp., 718 So. 2d 480 (La. App. 1998) (approving largely
identical nationwide settlement class action of General Motors pickup truck claims under Louisiana's
Code of Civil Procedure).
107. For two recent class actions following this pattern, see Doe v. Interstate Brands Corp., No. 98
C 1075, 1998 WL 196456 (N.D. III. Apr. 17, 1998) and Augillard v. Cytec Indus., No. Civ. A. 97-913,
1997 WL411572 (E.D. La. July 18, 1997).
108. The proposed rule would allow a class action where "the parties to a settlement request
certification under subdivision (b)(3) for purposes of settlement, even though the requirements of
subdivision (b)(3) might not be met for purposes of trial." Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, FED. R. Ctv. P. 23(b)(4) (August 1996).
109. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, FED.
R. Civ. P. 23(b)(4), advisory committee's note (August 1996) (explaining that the amendment was
designed to resolve the "newly apparent disagreement" between courts that permit settlement class
actions even if the class could not be certified for trial, and the recent Third Circuit decisions, citing
Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 626 (3d Cir. 1996), aff d on other grounds sub nom.
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); and In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck
Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 799 (3d Cir. 1995)).
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a voluntary dismissal of the lawsuit."° A class action settlement, by contrast,
requires court approval.'l The court examines the proposed class action settle-
ment in order to protect the interests of the absent class members. To some
extent, then, a court's inquiry into the merits of a settlement class action reflects
the need in all class actions for the court to rule on the fairness of a settlement.
Settlement class actions, however, raise special concerns not present in
ordinary class actions. Settlement class actions present a powerful risk of
collusion between defendants and plaintiffs' counsel, inadequate representation
of the class, and inadequate bargaining power on the plaintiffs' side. 1 2 Three
concerns stand out as particularly troubling. First, settlement class actions may
allow defendants, in essence, to auction off the class action franchise to the
lowest bidder among potential plaintiffs' class counsel. If a would-be class
lawyer agrees to settle on terms favorable to the defendant, the lawyer gets the
chance to earn the substantial fees that accompany successful class representa-
tion. If the would-be class lawyer demands better terms for the plaintiffs, then
the defendant can simply initiate talks with a different lawyer, who may be
willing to agree to the defendant's terms. 1' 3 Second, class counsel may be
subject to conflicts of interest that call into question the adequacy of class
representation. In particular, if class counsel represents a number of individual
plaintiffs with claims against the defendant," 4 the defendant may be willing to
pay a premium on those individual claims in order to secure class counsel's
assent to a less attractive settlement of the class claims.1 5 Third, if a settlement
class action would not be certifiable for purposes of litigation,'1 6 the plaintiff
class loses a critical bargaining chip-it cannot threaten to go to trial. Thus, the
plaintiff class negotiating a settlement class action can find itself inadequately
represented and at a bargaining disadvantage. " 7 The leading solution to these
110. See FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a) (providing for voluntary dismissal).
111. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (requiring court approval of any class action dismissal or compro-
mise).
112. These concerns have been addressed forcefully by other commentators. See, e.g., John C.
Coffee Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1343 (1995);
Koniak, supra note 76; Brian Wolfman & Alan B. Morrison, Representing the Unrepresented in Class
Actions Seeking Monetary Relief, 71 N.YU. L. REv. 439 (1996).
113. See Coffee, supra note 112, at 1379; John C. Coffee Jr., Rule of Law: The Corruption of the
Class Action, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 1994, at A15 ("In short, settlement class actions permit defendants
to run a reverse auction, seeking the lowest bidder from a large population of plaintiffs' attorneys.").
114. Such plaintiffs are sometimes referred to as "inventory plaintiffs," part of a particular lawyer's
"inventory" of claims, to distinguish them from class members who are not individually represented by
class counsel.
115. See Coffee, supra note 112, at 1373; Koniak, supra note 76, at 1064-85.
116. This can occur if a class action satisfies all of Rule 23's requirements given the settlement, but
without the settlement would fail Rule 23(b)(3)'s superiority requirement because of trial manageability
problems. See supra note 89.
117. See Coffee, supra note 112, at 1379. But see Judith Resnik, Aggregation, Settlement, and
Dismay, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 918, 938 (1995) (pointing out that mass torts may not be uniquely
disabling of plaintiffs' attorneys, because even in other types of cases attorneys may have limited ability
or inclination to take a case to trial).
2002 [Vol. 87:1983
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problems may be inadequate, but is without doubt a necessary minimum: the
trial court must undertake a searching, skeptical inquiry into both the adequacy
of representation and the fairness of the resulting settlement.
Procedural policy-makers appreciate the importance of a vigorous inquiry
into the substantive merits of settlement class actions. The Federal Judicial
Center's Manual for Complex Litigation (Third), for example, emphasizes the
importance of scrutinizing the merits of settlement class actions. After noting
the permissibility of settlement classes, the Manual warns: "Approval under
Rule 23(e) of settlements involving settlement classes, however, requires closer
judicial scrutiny than approval of settlements where class certification has been
litigated."' 18 Professors Judith Resnik and John Coffee have proposed a Rule
23 revision that would explicitly impose higher burdens for certifying settle-
ment classes, in order to ensure adequate representation and fair settlement
terms. '19
As to class settlements generally, the federal Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules, in its notes on a recent proposed revision of Rule 23(e), urged the
importance of judicial inquiry into the fairness of class settlements.' 20 The
committee pointed out that parties to a settlement "cease to be adversaries," and
that "[j]udicial responsibility to the class is heavy."' 2'' Even if there are no
objectors to the settlement, and even if no one has requested a hearing, the
committee noted, the court should nevertheless hold a hearing to inquire into the
fairness of the proposed settlement. 122 The embarrassing inadequacy of some
recent class settlements drives home the importance of skeptical judicial scru-
tiny. 123
Some courts have taken quite seriously their responsibility to investigate the
proposed settlement. They have rejected settlement class actions on the grounds
of inadequate settlements.1 24 Several courts have noted that approval of a
118. M.C.L.3d, supra note 23, § 30.45.
119. See Judith Resnik & John C. Coffee, Jr., Letter to Chair of Advisory Committee on Civil Rules,
reprinted in 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 863 (1997); see also Jay H. Tidmarsh, Mass Tort Settlement Class
Actions: Five Case Studies and Their Implications for the Reform of Rule 23, at 235-38 (1998)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (proposing detailed standards for evaluating settlement
class actions).
120. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate Civil and
Criminal Procedure, FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e), advisory committee note (Aug. 1996) [hereinafter Prelimi-
nary Draft of Proposed Amendments]; see also William W. Schwarzer, Settlement of Mass Tort Class
Actions: Order Out of Chaos, 80 CoiRELL L. REv. 837, 843 (1995) (proposing criteria for judging
fairness of class action settlements).
121. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments, supra note 120.
122. See id.
123. See Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, The Inadequate Search for "Adequacy" in Class
Actions: A Critique of Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 765, 785 & n.87, 786 (1998)
(recounting a number of widely criticized state court class settlements, including one in which a class
member recovered $4.38 but was charged $80.00 toward the attorneys' fee).
124. See, e.g., Clement v. American Honda Fin. Corp., 176 F.R.D. 15, 24-32 (D. Conn. 1997)
(rejecting settlement class action upon finding that settlement was not fair and reasonable compromise
of plaintiffs' claims, after thorough examination of settlement terms); see also In re Ford Motor Co.
1999] 2003
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settlement class action requires a higher standard of fairness than the usual
approval of a class settlement. 125 In the Amchem asbestos settlement class
action, the district court appointed a special master to investigate aspects of the
fairness of the proposed settlement.' 2 6 The district court's fairness hearing
concerning the settlement in that case lasted eighteen days over the course of
five weeks, and involved testimony from medical, financial, and legal ex-
perts. 127 In Ortiz, Judge Parker appointed a guardian ad litem to analyze the
adequacy of the settlement from the point of view of members of the class.'
2 8
The fairness hearing lasted eight days spread over two weeks and, as in
Amchem, involved testimony from numerous experts and others. 12
9
Not all judges have taken their responsibility so seriously, however. 130 Some
judges have approved settlement class actions upon troublingly limited inqui-
ries. The fairness hearing for a settlement class action in a contaminated blood
case, for example, lasted only one day, during which the court heard no expert
testimony and allowed no cross-examination. 3 t In one empirical study of
Bronco II Prods. Liab. Litig., No. Civ. A. MDL-991, 1995 WL 222177, at *9 (E.D. La. Apr. 12, 1995)
(rejecting class action settlement where terms gave inadequate value for compromised claims, and
where class counsel performed inadequate discovery prior to settlement).
125. See, e.g., Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998) ("The dangers of
collusion between class counsel and the defendant, as well as the need for additional protections when
the settlement is not negotiated by a court-designated class representative, weigh in favor of a more
probing inquiry than may normally be required under Rule 23(e)."); In re General Motors Corp. Pickup
Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F3d 768, 805 (3d Cir. 1995) ("We affirm the need for courts to
be even more scrupulous than usual in approving settlements where no class has yet been formally
certified.").
126. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 258 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (noting appoint-
ment of Professor Stephen Burbank as special master, on joint motion of the settling parties); see also
In re Combustion, Inc., 978 F. Supp. 673, 673-75 (W.D. La. 1997) (using special master to advise on
disbursement of settlement funds in toxic tort litigation class action, in consultation with medical
expert). The use of special masters to review settlements does not appear to be commonplace in class
actions generally. See WILLGING ET AL., supra note 76, at 64 (reporting that of 126 proposed settlements
in class action study, only two were assigned to special masters, and neither of those involved reporting
to the judge on the settlement's merits).
127. See TIDMARSH, supra note 77, at 50.
128. See In re Asbestos Litig., 90 F.3d 963, 972 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting appointment of Professor
Eric Green as guardian ad litem for the class); Eric D. Green, Advancing Individual Rights Through
Group Justice, 30 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 791, 798-99, 803 (1997) (discussing Green's role in Ortiz).
129. See TIDMARSH, supra note 76, at 62-63.
130. In a thorough study of five mass tort settlement class actions, Professor Jay Tidmarsh con-
cluded, "In none of the cases, in my estimation, did the courts adequately analyze the factors that were
identified as being relevant [to the fairness inquiry]." TIDMARSH, supra note 77, at 6. The Tidmarsh
study included the Amchem and Ortiz asbestos cases, the Bowling v. Pfizer heart valve case, a Silicone
Gel Breast Implant settlement class action that later unraveled, and the Factor VIII or IX contaminated
blood case. Interestingly, Professor Tidmarsh observed that the district courts' opinions tended to
emphasize whichever fairness factors favored approval of the particular settlement class action. For
example, the Ortiz court emphasized maturity as a factor and approved the settlement in part because
asbestos is a mature mass tort, whereas the Bowling court deemphasized the maturity factor and
approved the settlement despite the immaturity of the heart valve litigation. See id.
131. See id. at 93 (describing fairness hearing in Walker v. Bayer Corp.); see also id. at 35
(describing fairness hearing in Bowling v. Pfizer, the Bjork-Shiley heart valve settlement class action, in
which objectors were not allowed to cross-examine presenters, and were allowed only limited discovery
2004
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federal class actions in four districts, eighty-six percent of settlement class
actions were approved by the district court without any changes to the settle-
ment.132 Given the risks inherent in settlement class actions, and the stakes
involved in mass torts, no mass tort settlement class action should be approved
without an extensive fairness hearing and a vigorous independent judicial
inquiry into the propriety of the settlement terms.
HI. INQUISITORIAL JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES
When a judge turns to a court-appointed expert in a scientifically com-
plex mass tort litigation, or investigates the merits of a proposed settle-
ment class action, the judge is simply trying to resolve a massive dispute justly
and efficiently. The judge, most likely, is not thinking about comparative
systems of adjudication. But if we step back from the urgencies of each
particular mass tort litigation, and examine the trends more broadly, we cannot
help but see emerging patterns of an inquisitorial justice system, such as the
legal systems of Germany, 13 3 France,1 34 Italy,13 5 Brazil, 1 36 Chile, 13 7 South Korea,
13 8
into alleged collusion between defendant and class counsel); id. at 77-78 (describing limited fairness
hearing in the breast implant settlement class action, and court's approval of revised settlement without
any fairness hearing). In fairness to Judge Spiegel, who handled the Bowling v. Pfizer heart valve case,
it should be noted that although the hearing was relatively limited, Judge Spiegel did prompt various
changes to the settlement. See Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 138, 139-41 (S.D. Ohio 1992)
(continuing fairness hearing pending parties' response to court's concerns about proposed settlement);
Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (approving settlement after amendments to
address some of court's concerns); Wolfman & Morrison, supra note 113, at 490 n. 110 (discussing this
aspect of Bowling v. Pfizer as a positive example of courts' ability to effect changes to problematic
settlements).
132. See WILLGING ET AL., supra note 76, at 35 (of 28 clear settlement class actions, 24 settlements
were approved unchanged).
133. See HERBERT J. LIEBESNY, FOREIGN LEGAL SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 327-45 (1981);
William B. Fisch, Recent Developments in West German Civil Procedure, 6 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REv. 221, 279 (1983) ("The 'grand discriminant' between West German and American procedure today
is the division of labor between judge and lawyers. German civil procedure is a judge-driven system,
and, if anything, the reforms of the 1970's have reinforced that tendency."); John H. Langbein, The
German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 823 (1985); Ernst C. Stiefel & James R.
Maxeiner, Civil Justice Reform in the United States-Opportunity for Learning from 'Civilized'
European Procedure Instead of Continued Isolation?, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 147 (1994).
134. See JAMES G. APPLE & ROBERT P. DEYLING, A PRIMER ON THE Civt-LAw SYSTEM 1 (1995);
LIEBESNY, supra note 133, at 308-26. According to Liebesny, the French judicial system has become
more inquisitorial since a 1973 decree that enhanced the position of the judge and strongly emphasized
the establishment of the truth. See LIEBESNY, supra note 133, at 312-13. Nevertheless, Liebesny
suggests that the French system is not truly "inquisitory rather than adversary," although French judges
take a more active role than their counterparts in the United States or United Kingdom. Id. at 308-09.
135. See Angelo Piero Sereni, Basic Features of Civil Procedure in Italy, 1 AM. J. COMP. L. 373
(1952).
136. See APPLE & DEYLING, supra note 134, at 18-19; Jos6 Maria Othon Sidou, Brazil, in 1
INrERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW B43, B54 (1973).
137. See APPLE & DEYLING, supra note 134, at 17-18; Manuel Sanhueza Cruz, Chile, in 1
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW C49, C57 (1973); Robert G. Vaughn, Proposals
for Judicial Reform in Chile, 16 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 577, 582 (1993).
138. See Eric Ilhyung Lee, Expert Evidence in the Republic of Korea and Under the U.S. Federal
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Egypt, t39 and other civil law countries throughout continental Europe, Latin
America and elsewhere.
A. THE INQUISITORIAL APPROACH
At the risk of oversimplification, and courting the disapprobation of serious
scholars of comparative law, I think a few generalizations about civil law
systems will serve well here as a foil for examining the handling of mass tort
litigation in the United States. Although the "inquisitorial" systems of the
various civil law countries differ from each other in significant ways, 140 they
share certain attributes that give the adversary parties less control over the
adjudication process than in the United States, and that give the court correspond-
ingly greater control.
The inquisitorial court has primary responsibility for investigating the facts, a
load borne primarily by litigants in the United States through both the formal
discovery process and informal investigation. As Professor John Langbein
wrote in his influential but controversial study of German procedure, The
German Advantage in Civil Procedure, "the court rather than the parties'
lawyers takes the main responsibility for gathering and sifting evidence, al-
though the lawyers exercise a watchful eye over the court's work.... Digging
for facts is primarily the work of the judge." 141 The contrast between the civil
Rules of Evidence: A Comparative Study, 19 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 585 (1997). Korea's legal
system developed under Japanese rule in the early twentieth century and thus followed Japan's civil law
model, which in turn was based largely on Germany's. See id. at 588; see also Paul Kichyon Ryu,
Republic of Korea, in 1 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW R3, R9-R1O (1973) ("In
Korea the judicial system follows the Roman-Civil Law pattern. This means that both in civil and in
criminal trials judges assume a leading role in the proceedings and direct the taking of evidence."). But
see Jae Hoo Lee, Korea, in Dispatching the Opposition: A Legal Guide to Transnational Litigation,
INT'L FINANCIAL L. REv. SUPPLEMENT 19, 20 (Aug. 1992) (describing Korean system as basically a
continental system rooted in the Japanese and German, but stating that in civil cases the parties control
the judicial process). Japan began moving away from the civil law inquisitorial model and incorporat-
ing some aspects of the U.S. adversary system during the U.S. occupation following the second world
war, but remains largely an inquisitorial system on the German model. See HIROSHI ODA, JAPANESE
LAW 367-68 (1992).
139. See Hiram E. Chodosh et al., Egyptian Civil Justice Process Modernization: A Functional and
Systemic Approach, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 865, 887-88 (1996).
140. For one of many possible examples, while civil law countries typically use a noncontinuous
trial and emphasize written evidence, see infra text accompanying notes 158-60, Brazilian procedure
uses a concentrated trial at which oral evidence predominates. See Othon Sidou, supra note 136, at
B54. On the whole, the German and Austrian legal systems, and those based on them, tend to employ
the most clearly inquisitorial procedures. The "Romanist" legal systems of France, Italy and a few of
their neighbors deviate a bit more from the inquisitorial model. The Iberian systems and the Spanish
and Portuguese-based systems of Latin America, while based on civil law traditions, allow somewhat
greater party control over proceedings. See Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth, A Comparative
Conclusion, in 16 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 6-436, 6-439 - 6-444 (1984).
See generally JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CivIL LAW TRADITION 1 (2d ed. 1985) (using term "legal
tradition" rather than "legal system" to emphasize commonalities within civil law tradition despite
diversity among specific civil law systems).
141. Langbein, supra note 133, at 826-27. Germany often serves as the prototypical example of an
2006
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law "inquisitorial" approach and the United States "adversarial" approach,
while by no means absolute, is profound: "The inquisitorial court's unqualified
obligation to ascertain the truth has no counterpart in American courts. That
would contravene the party-control feature of the adversary system."1 4 2 A
Portuguese commentary captures the essential characteristic, describing Portu-
gal's procedural system as "a moderately inquisitorial system which serves the
public interest, because judicial powers of investigation to ascertain the objec-
tive truth predominate over party control of the proceedings." 14 3
Civil law judicial systems rely heavily on experts,' 44 but consistent with the
notion that the judge has primary responsibility for investigating the facts, they
do not rely much on experts chosen by the litigants. Rather, they rely on experts
sought, selected, and supervised by the court. Unlike in the United States, where
court-appointed experts remain a rarity, 14 5 court-appointed experts in civil law
countries are the norm. In Germany, for example, the court may seek expertise
on its own motion or at a party's request.' 4 6 Typically, the court nominates and
selects the expert. 1 47 A litigant can challenge the expert's appointment only on
certain narrow grounds.1 4 8 Not only does the court seek and select the expert,
the court formulates the expert's task. 14 9 German courts, unsurprisingly, tend to
place more weight on the opinion of the court-appointed expert than on the
opinion of an expert selected by a party.' 50 Likewise, French courts choose their
inquisitorial system, and this article will use it as such, with occasional references to other civil law
countries to fill out the description. In the French tribunal de grande instance, the judge has the power
to investigate the facts. See LIEBESNY, supra note 133, at 312-13, 317-18. In Colombia, "[t]he judge is
empowered to order the presentation of necessary evidence .... H. Devis Echandfa & Carlos
Bueno-Guzm.n, Colombia, in 1 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW C63, C69
(1976). In Brazil, "[t]he important role of the judge in the direction of the case explains why Brazilian
procedure received from Portugal the 'conclusive opening order' (despacho saneador), which estab-
lishes the terms of the dispute and the opening of the investigatory phase." Othon Sidou, supra note
136, at B54. Similarly, Chilean "judges operate in an inquisitorial rather than adversarial model. This
model places the management and development of the case in the hands of the judge .... It removes the
case from control of the parties and distances the parties from the judicial process." Vaughn, supra note
137, at 582.
142. Franklin Strier, What Can the American Adversary System Learn from an Inquisitorial System
of Justice?, 76 JUDICATURE 109, 162 (1992).
143. Gomes Canotilho et al., Portugal, in 1 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW
P185, P199 (1993).
144. See Langbein, supra note 133, at 836 ("European legal systems are, by contrast [to the United
States], expert-prone.") (citing INSTITUT DE DROIT COMPARE DE PARIS, L'EXPERTISE DANS LES PRINCI-
PAUX SYSTEMES JURIDIQUES D'EUROPE (1969)).
145. See supra text accompanying notes 25-31.
146. See Langbein, supra note 133, at 829, 835-41, citing Zivilprozessordnung (Code of Civil
Procedure) § 404 [hereinafter ZPO] (concerning expert evidence (sachverstandigenbeweis)).
147. See id. at 837.
148. See id. at 839, citing ZPO, supra note 146, § 406(I).
149. See id.
150. See LIEBESNY, supra note 133, at 336 (In Germany, "[eixperts are considered, as in France, the
court's rather than the parties' experts. They are appointed by the court .... Either party may submit an
opinion by an expert of its own choosing. However, the court will not place much weight on the
opinion of such an expert and will prefer that of a court-appointed expert.").
1999] 2007
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own impartial experts, 51 and in Italy an expert is considered an "auxiliary of
the court." 152
Unlike in United States trials, where witnesses are examined and cross-
examined primarily by the litigants' lawyers, 153 witnesses in inquisitorial sys-
tems are examined primarily by the court. The German judge, for example,
serves as examiner-in-chief of the witnesses.' 54 Counsel may pose additional
questions, but counsel's opportunity to examine is quite limited, and is not
permitted to cover the same ground covered by the court's questioning. 155 As to
witness selection, German lawyers may nominate witnesses, but they may not
prepare or coach those witnesses. 156 In France, a court may order an enqute
and hear the witness. The witness testifies in narrative form, and then the judge
asks questions. Although parties and lawyers may suggest questions to the
judge, they may not question the witness directly. 1
57
Moreover, inquisitorial systems generally use a noncontinuous, issue-
separated trial. By taking testimony on particular issues, rather than taking the
testimony for the entire case during a single trial, an inquisitorial court can
focus initially on those issues most likely to be dispositive.158 As Professor
Langbein puts it, because the German court has no sequence rules and no
separation of discovery and trial, "the court ranges over the entire case,
constantly looking for the jugular-for the issue of law or fact that might
dispose of the case." 159 Thus, in a products liability case where there is serious
doubt about whether the product in fact caused the alleged injury, the court can
examine the potentially dispositive issue of causation before burdening itself
151. See id. at 317.
152. See Sereni, supra note 135, at 383 n.52.
153. United States judges have the power to question witnesses directly, see FED. R. EvID. 614(b),
but it is not the norm.
154. See LIEBESNY, supra note 133, at 335; Langbein, supra note 133, at 828, citing ZPO, supra note
147, §§ 395-97.
155. See LIEBESNY, supra note 133, at 335.
156. See Langbein, supra note 133, at 834; see also Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Some Comparative
Reflections on First Instance Civil Procedure: Recent Reforms in German Civil Procedure and in the
Federal Rules, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 609, 619 (1988) (observing that some contact between
attorneys and witnesses is allowed under current German rules, but that "[i]t still remains true ... that
German judges are suspicious of witnesses who have been examined by a lawyer prior to giving their
testimony in court").
157. See LIEBESNY, supra note 133, at 315-16, 335.
158. See Strier, supra note 142, at 111; see also APPLE & DEYLING, supra note 134, at 27 ("In
contrast to the progressive unfolding of evidence-under near complete control of the parties-that
occurs through the discovery process in the American common-law system, there is no formal civil-law
counterpart to discovery. Nor, in most cases, is there any single event that the common-law lawyer
would recognize as a trial.").
159. Langbein, supra note 133, at 830; see also LIEBESNY, supra note 134, at 326, 345 (describing
French and German approaches); Sereni, supra note 135, at 385 (describing the lack of a concentrated
trial in the Italian system). Although the U.S. concentrated trial system does not lend itself to "looking
for the jugular," courts handling mass tort cases occasionally use bifurcation or trifurcation of trial as a
technique to allow the factfinder to determine first the issue most likely to be dispositive. See, e.g., In re
Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
2008
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with testimony about product defect, fault, warnings, or other matters. 160
A system in which the court proactively investigates the issue most likely to
be dispositive? This resembles the approach taken by Judge Jones in the Hall
breast implant litigation, in which he dismissed plaintiffs' claims after seeking
neutral expert advice on whether plaintiffs' systemic causation theory had
scientific validity. 16 ' A system in which courts rely on experts sought, selected,
and supervised by the court, rather than on experts hired by the litigants? This
resembles the approach taken not only by Judges Jones and Pointer in the breast
implant litigation, but also by Judges Weinstein, Lifland, and Rubin in the
asbestos litigation, and by Judge Borman in the Bendectin case. 162 This also
resembles what Justice Breyer and the American Association for the Advance-
ment of Science have been urging judges to do in order to address the scientific
difficulties of complex litigation. 163
A system in which courts actively inquire into the merits of a dispute, rather
than passively reacting to the presentations of the adversary parties? This
resembles the approach of Judges Reed and Parker in the Amchem and Ortiz
asbestos settlement class actions, holding lengthy hearings and even appointing
a special master to inquire into the fairness of settlements negotiated by the
adversaries. '64 In fact this seems like the proper course for any judge faced with
a settlement class action, given the risks of injustice inherent in such cases. 165
In their efforts to tackle the intractable problems of modem mass tort
litigation, careful and innovative U.S. jurists have borrowed tools from the
160. As one scholar has stated:
The civil law judge's inquiry is not "What evidence should be heard to understand the whole
case?" but "What evidence do I require to reach a justifiable decision?" The information
needed to decide a case could concern only one or two issues .... Considerations of
efficiency would lead the civil law judge to approach complicated litigation in precisely this
fashion-that is, issue by issue.
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery and the Role of the Judge in Civil Law Jurisdictions, 73 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1017, 1022 (1998).
161. See supra text accompanying notes 37-40 (describing Judge Jones' appointment of a panel of
scientific experts to advise the court on the scientific validity of plaintiffs' causation theory, and the
resulting dismissal of plaintiffs' claims).
162. See supra text accompanying notes 35-59; see also Tahirih V. Lee, Court-Appointed Experts
and Judicial Reluctance: A Proposal to Amend Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 6 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 480, 497 (1988) ("[T]he use of court-appointed experts may be viewed as a deviation from
the adversarial nature of a trial employed in order to further the truth-seeking goal of the system.").
163. See supra text accompanying notes 60-62.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 126-27 (discussing fairness hearing and special master in
Amchem, and fairness hearing in Ortiz).
165. See supra text accompanying notes 112-15 (discussing settlement class action risks of collu-
sion, inadequate class representation, and inferior class bargaining power). The difference between
settlement class actions and traditional adversarial litigation is driven home by the argument, advanced
by objectors to some recent settlement class actions, that such actions fail to present any justiciable case
or controversy under Article Il. The petitioners in Ortiz, for example, argued that a federal court lacks
power to adjudicate a matter "brought by plaintiffs who do not in good faith plead claims they intend to
litigate, but who bring suit as a friendly joint venture with the defendants .... Brief for Petitioners at
i, Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 118 S. Ct. 2339 (June 22, 1998) (No. 97-1704).
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inquisitorial toolbox. 166 They have dug into scientific facts and substantive
merits, unwilling to rely solely on adversary presentations. Their efforts have
been valiant and their successes important, but we must remain realistic about
the obstacles to effective inquisitorial judging in the United States, even as we
applaud the trend toward greater use of inquisitorial tools in mass tort litigation.
B. THE POORLY EQUIPPED UNITED STATES INQUISITORIAL JUDGE
Many U.S. legal commentators have urged broad adoption of aspects of the
inquisitorial system.' 67 Perhaps these commentators are heartened by the shift
taking place in modem mass tort litigation. Perhaps court-appointed experts,
settlement class actions with intense judicial oversight, and other inquisitorial
approaches are exactly what mass torts need. Perhaps these developments are
something of a culmination of the twenty-year trend of managerial judging in
the United States.1 68
166. In his exhaustive analysis of attempts to define "complex litigation," Professor Jay Tidmarsh
explains from a number of angles that complex litigation can best be understood in terms of the
inability of courts to resolve the disputes without taking on powers traditionally reserved for such other
actors as the parties and their lawyers. See Jay H. Tidmarsh, Unattainable Justice: The Forms of
Complex Litigation and the Limits of Judicial Power, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683 (1992). Of
particular relevance here, Tidmarsh discusses the work of Mirjan Damalka and Lon Fuller showing that
"certain cases poorly fit the form of adversarial adjudication prevalent in the United States today." Id.
at 1722. "The relevance of Damagka's work to the problem of complex litigation lies in the intriguing
possibility that some cases (i.e., the 'complex' cases) within our society might not fit the dominant
mode of process, and must therefore be resolved under procedures different from those governing the
vast majority of cases." Id. at 1724. From Fuller, Tidmarsh derives a closely related definition of
complex--or to use Fuller's somewhat different term, "polycentric"-cases: "those cases in which the
interests of all persons significantly affected by a controversy cannot be definitively resolved through
the parties' adversarial presentation of proofs and reasoned argument to a neutral arbiter." Id. at 1729.
Given these attributes of such complex or polycentric matters as mass torts, it is hardly surprising that
judges have borrowed inquisitorial approaches. As Tidmarsh concludes in part of his universal
definition, "complex litigation involves the inability of a properly functioning adversarial system to
guarantee reasoned judgment, a reality that provokes a nonadversarial exercise of judicial power
designed to preserve reasoned judgment." Id. at 1755; see also TIDMARSH & TRANGSRUD, supra note 18,
at 82, 86 (defining complex litigation roughly as "those cases that the modem American adversary
system is ill-equipped to handle," and then more precisely as cases in which one or more of the
adversary system participants cannot function properly, and in which "the dysfunction [is] curable by
the non-adversarial application of judicial power").
167. See, e.g., Hein Kotz, The Reform of the Adversary System, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 478, 486 (1981);
Langbein, supra note 133, at 866 ("The success of German civil procedure stands as an enduring
reproach to those who say that we must continue to suffer adversary tricksters in the proof of fact.");
Stiefel & Maxeiner, supra note 133 (advocating reform in the direction of inquisitorial systems, and
criticizing American lawyers for their unwillingness to adopt foreign ideas); Strier, supra note 142, at
109 (arguing that some inquisitorial practices "could beneficially be imported into our trial proce-
dure"); Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND. L.J. 301,
302-03 (1989) (concluding that nonadversarial elements in U.S. litigation, especially in complex
litigation, "promote sound values and contribute to a more effective system," but that perhaps adoption
of these non-adversarial elements requires abandonment of adversary ideology).
168. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376 (1982) (discussing and criticizing
development of managerial judging); Langbein, supra note 133, at 858-62, 865-66 (arguing that
managerial judging is irreconcilable with adversary theory, and viewing trend toward managerial
2010
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More likely, however, they are destined for failure, or at least incompleteness,
because U.S. judges are ill-equipped for effective inquisitorial judging. Even as
we urge judges to use the inquisitorial tools that can help achieve just and
efficient resolutions to mass torts, we should note realistically the barriers that
stand in the way. As a matter of judicial culture, training and structure, the U.S.
judiciary may be poorly positioned to take on substantial inquisitorial responsi-
bilities.
By this, I do not mean to suggest that all of the barriers impeding adoption of
inquisitorial methods should be torn down. There is great value in the adversary
system and its pervasive culture, in the law-making role of U.S. judges, in the
typical U.S. judicial career path and selection process, and in the dominance of
generalist judges. I do mean to suggest, though, that particular inquisitorial
approaches have proved useful in resolving mass torts, and that in encouraging
and enabling courts to use those devices, we must be cognizant of the cultural
and structural barriers that courts face.
Moreover, while barriers of culture and structure inhibit convulsive changes,
they do not foreclose evolution. Those barriers make it unlikely that the rather
dramatic use of inquisitorial devices by Judges Jones, Pointer, Reed, Weinstein,
and a few others will suddenly change the course of mass tort litigation. But
even if these inquisitorial devices are perceived as mutations within the adver-
sary system, the mutations ultimately may prove fit to survive in the episodic
evolutionary development of the adjudicatory process. 169
Judicial culture plays a powerful role. Whatever the urgencies of modern
mass tort litigation, U.S. judges for the most part continue to behave in
accordance with deeply ingrained notions concerning the judicial role. Although
generalizations belie the wide range of approaches and attitudes among U.S.
judging as a sign of convergence with inquisitorial systems). See generally M.C.L.3d, supra note 23
(generally urging judges in complex cases to manage the cases actively). In her critique of managerial
judging, Professor Resnik notes that pretrial management "breaks sharply from American norms of
adjudication." Resnik, supra, at 413. She concludes with a plea "to take away trial judges' roving
commission and to bring back the blindfold.... Our society has not yet openly and deliberately
decided to discard the traditional adversarial model in favor of some version of the continental or
inquisitorial model." Id. at 445.
Another trend in mass tort litigation away from traditional adversarialism, although not necessarily in
the direction of the civil law inquisitorial model, is the increase in voluntary information exchanges by
adversary parties. See M.C.L.3d, supra note 23, § 21.423; George J. Grumbach Jr. & Howard M.
Erichson, Cost-Conscious Alternatives to Massive United States Discovery, 23 KOKUSAI SH6J1 HOMU J.
JAPANESE INST. INT'L Bus. L. 1225, 1229-31 (1995) (in Japanese) (discussing voluntary interviews in
lieu of depositions, mutual centralized document depositories, and other discovery options in mass
litigation); Jay H. Tidmarsh, Civil Procedure: The Last Ten Years, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 503, 509 (1996).
169. Cf. STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE PANDA'S THUMB 179-85 (1980) (advancing the model of
punctuated equilibria, which posits that biological evolution occurs episodically rather than gradually).
But cf. RICHARD DAWKINS, THE BLIND WATCHMAKER 223-52 (1987) (taking issue with Gould's
punctuationist theory). Dr. Dawkins, I expect, would object to my use of the word "evolution" to
describe development of the adjudicatory process, because Judge Jones and the others decided to
appoint their own experts and decided to scrutinize the merits of settlement class actions; the
innovations did not result from random, undesigned mutations. See Dawkins, supra, at 311.
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judges, it is possible to offer a few contrasts between most U.S. judges and their
counterparts in civil law countries.
First, U.S. judges tend to view their role in the context of an adversary
system.' 70 On this view, the judge is an umpire who must above all resolve the
dispute presented. In the words of one U.S. commentator, "the role of the judge
is to decide between competing presentations of evidence and law that are
tendered by the advocates."' 7 The umpireal self-image presents a barrier to
effective inquisitorial judging. If the judge's perceived role is to decide between
competing presentations, and if the parties' prerogative and responsibility is to
make those presentations, then appointment of an independent expert must seem
to exceed the judge's role and trample on the role of the adversary parties and
their lawyers. Similarly, if the judge's perceived role is to resolve the dispute
presented, then digging into the merits of a settlement embraced by the adversar-
ies seems to make little sense.
When asked to explain their reluctance to appoint neutral experts, U.S. judges
point to their esteem for the adversary system.' 72 In the words of one federal
judge, "We're conditioned to respect the adversary process. If a lawyer fails to
explain the basis for a case, that's his problem." 173 Another judge explained,
"In general, it conflicts with my sense of the judicial role, which is to trust the
adversaries to present information and arguments. I do not believe the judge
should normally be an inquisitor." 174 A third judge cited her "great respect for
the adversarial process" in declining to use Rule 706 in a Dalkon Shield case.
17 5
In Justice Breyer's 1998 speech to the American Association for the Advance-
ment of Science, he speculated on why judges rarely appoint their own scientific
experts: "They may hesitate simply because the process is unfamiliar, or
because the use of this kind of technique inevitably raises questions. Will use of
an independent expert... inappropriately deprive the parties of control over the
presentation of a case?" 176 Faced with conflicting scientific opinions from the
partisan experts, judges almost always prefer to allow the factfinder to choose
between the conflicting positions, rather than to appoint an independent expert
170. See Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031
(1975); John C. Reitz, Why We Probably Cannot Adopt the German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 75
IOWA L. REv. 987 (1990); see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble With the Adversary System in a
Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 5, 40 (1996) ("Adversarialism is so
powerful a heuristic and organizing framework for our culture, that, much like a great whale, it seems
to swallow up any effort to modify or transform it.").
171. Hazard, supra note 160, at 1019.
172. See Cecil & Willging, supra note 25, at 1018-19; see also Strier, supra note 142, at 111
("Conforming with adversarial precepts of party control and judicial passivity, American judges rarely
exercise their prerogative to call expert witnesses.").
173. Cecil & Willging, supra note 25, at 1019.
174. Id.
175. Gold v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, No. B-82-383 (EBB), 1998 WL 351466, at *2 (D.
Conn. June 3, 1998).
176. Stephen Breyer, The Interdependence of Science and Law, Address at the 1998 AAAS Annual
Meeting (Feb. 16, 1998) <http://www.aaas.org/meetings/scope/breyer.htm>.
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to offer additional input. 177
Second, U.S. judges tend to place justifiable significance on their lawmaking
role, unlike civil law judges, for whom lawmaking is not a major responsibil-
ity. 178 Civil law countries have comprehensive statutory codes. 17 9 Thus, al-
though statutes inevitably require interpretation, judicial lawmaking in civil law
countries appears negligible compared to judicial lawmaking in common law
countries, where vast areas of law are left to common law development, and
where stare decisis holds sway.' 80 Because judicial lawmaking figures promi-
nently in the American judge's job description, judicial fact-gathering plays a
correspondingly smaller role than it does for the civil law judge. 181
The lawmaking role of the U.S. judge presents two barriers to effective
inquisitorial judging-one of propensity, the other of time. As a matter of
judicial propensity, a judge with important lawmaking responsibilities as a
player in common law development and as an interpreter of statutes and
constitutions may lack the inclination to devote vast amounts of time and
energy to factual investigation. Even if they had the inclination, judges with the
responsibility of sorting out the law lack the time to devote to detailed court-
driven factual investigation. For effective inquisitorial judging, the United
States either would need to remove the focus on judicial lawmaking, or would
need to hire many more judges. 182 Given the importance of common law
177. See, e.g., Hiern v. Sarpy, 161 F.R.D. 332 (E.D. La. 1995) (holding that mere disagreement
between parties' experts does not warrant appointment of neutral expert); Mallard Bay Drilling v.
Bessard, 145 F.R.D. 405 (W.D. La. 1993) (declining to appoint neutral expert to resolve conflicting
medical opinions, reasoning that "yet another expert" is unlikely to "enlighten or enhance" the court's
determination); Gallagher v. Latrobe Brewing Co., 31 F.R.D. 36 (W.D. Pa. 1962) (holding that mere
divergence in adversary experts' opinions is not sufficient basis for appointment of neutral expert where
court finds the conflicting opinions reasonable).
The AAAS-ABA National Conference of Lawyers and Scientists Task Force on Science and
Technology in the Courts concluded that "[t]he Task Force is by no means convinced" that courts
would be willing to use the assistance of court-appointed scientists and engineers. "Since many judges
have had previous careers as trial attorneys, some of them believe that judges should not actively
participate in eliciting evidence, and regard this as usurping the traditional role of the litigator."
AAAS-ABA NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF LAWYERS AND SCIENTISTS TASK FORCE ON SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY IN THE COURTS, ENHANCING THE AVAILABILITY OF RELIABLE AND IMPARTIAL SCIENTIFIC AND
TECHNICAL EXPERTISE TO THE FEDERAL COURTS: A REPORT TO THE CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON SCIENCE,
TCHNOLOGY, AND GOVERNMENT 6(1991).
178. See Reitz, supra note 170, at 999; APPLE & DEYLING, supra note 134, at 36-38.
179. See ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN & JAMES R. GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 3 (2d ed. 1977).
180. See APPLE & DEYLING, supra note 134, at 36-37.
181. See id. at 37-38 (discussing difference in attitudes between common law judges, who empha-
size lawmaking role, and civil law judges, who view themselves more as technical appliers of law to
fact); Reitz, supra note 170, at 999 (noting that judicial reelection or reappointment in United States
focuses on "the political function of judges, that is, their law-making function, and not on details of
court administration"). But see Langbein, supra note 133, at 855 (rejecting notion that "cultural
differences" make inquisitorial judging impossible in the United States); Stiefel & Maxeiner, supra
note 133, at 161-62 (challenging Reitz's conclusions).
182. See Reitz, supra note 170, at 997; see also Daniel J. Meador, Appellate Subject Matter
Organization: The German Design from an American Perspective, 5 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
27, 38 (1981) (noting that Germany, to accomplish effective inquisitorial judging, has many more
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development and stare decisis in this country, removing judicial lawmaking is
not a realistic option. Increasing the number of judges, while more feasible, may
be resisted not only as a matter of resource allocation, but also because
expanding the judiciary raises concerns about quality, accountability, and bureau-
cratization. 183
Beyond judicial culture, there are differences in judicial career incentives and
training. In most civil law countries, the judiciary and the practice of law repre-
sent divergent career paths. Law graduates in civil law countries make a career
choice to enter the judiciary, typically in their late twenties and with no prior
law practice experience. 184 In the United States, by contrast, lawyers typically
enter the judiciary after substantial careers as practitioners. Treating the judi-
ciary as a separate career track, civil law countries generally provide institution-
alized training for new judges. 185 In the words of one experienced U.S. judicial
administrator, most countries in the world are ahead of the United States on
judicial training "because most have a more professionalized judiciary."' 86
Career incentives in the civil law judiciary reinforce the inquisitorial ap-
proach. In Germany, according to Professor Langbein, tenure, promotion, and
salary grades depend on meritocratic review, including effective and diligent
fact-gathering.187 U.S. judges, whether appointed or elected, hardly expect their
tenure, compensation, reelection or reputation to rise or fall based on fact-
gathering. To some extent, especially in the federal judiciary, judicial indepen-
dence insulates judges from some of these career incentives. Moreover, the
careers and reputations of U.S. judges depend more on legal rulings and
efficient case dispositions than on diligent factual investigation. The United
States judicial career-typically the capstone to a successful career of advocacy,
rather than a separate civil service career track with training and incentives
geared toward investigation--does not foster ideals of fact-gathering as a civil
servant.1 88
judges than the United States). Alternatively, an expanded role for masters or magistrates might satisfy
the need for more judicial officers to conduct inquisitorial fact-gathering, but such an approach could
raise problems of accountability. Cf Silberman, supra note 23, at 2173-75 & n.205 (noting the value of
judicial adjuncts but raising concerns about excessive reliance on them, and distinguishing between
magistrates, who are "full-time federal judicial officers with appropriate accountability," and masters,
who are "part-time adjuncts to whom we should be wary of entrusting judicial power").
183. See, e.g., TIDMARSH & TRANGSRUD, supra note 18, at 74 (questioning whether Americans would
"tolerate the bureaucratization of the judiciary that adoption of the German model would entail").
184. See APPLE & DEYLING, supra note 134, at 38; Langbein, supra 133, at 849-50 (discussing
German judiciary); F.H. Lawson, Comparative Judicial Style, 25 AM. J. CoMP. L. 364, 365 (1977)
(discussing German, French and Italian judiciaries).
185. See APPLE & DEYLING, supra note 134, at 38.
186. Steven Flanders, A Model System?, 81 JUDICATURE 142, 143 (1998). Mr. Flanders served as the
Circuit Executive for the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit from 1980 until 1997.
187. See Langbein, supra note 133, at 850-51.
188. Professor Langbein does "not believe that we would have to institute a German-style career
judiciary in order to reform American civil procedure along German lines ... ." Id. at 854. He
nonetheless acknowledges that civil law judiciary career incentives provide a safeguard against "the
dangers inherent in the greatly augmented judicial role." Id. at 861.
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Finally, most civil law countries have specialized courts for different types of
cases. A judicial structure featuring specialized courts goes hand in hand with
the civil law approach of having separate statutory codes for separate areas of
law.' 89 Germany has specialized court systems for administrative law, tax and
fiscal matters, labor and employment law, and social security, and each special-
ized court has its own appellate system. 90 Specialized courts, by enabling
judges to acquire greater familiarity with a particular substantive area, can
facilitate more proactive judicial involvement in fact-gathering.
This differs from the United States, where there are fewer specialized courts,
and where appeals from specialized courts such as tax courts go to the regular
courts of appeal. The rise of specialized courts appears unlikely for the United
States in the foreseeable future. The Federal Courts Study Committee noted in
1990 that "most American lawyers find the idea of specialized courts repug-
nant," and that specialized courts would face a host of other problems in this
country, including the danger of "capture" of the court by the interest group
most affected by the court's specialized business.1 91
The steps that U.S. courts ought to take to deal sensibly with mass tort
litigation are steps that do not mesh neatly with the U.S. judicial role. Because
appointing neutral experts runs counter to the deeply ingrained sensibilities of
U.S. judges, courts have not made widespread use of court-appointed scientific
experts, even though that is what is needed to deal with scientific complexity
and the risk of truth-defeating by adversary experts, and even though the stakes
in mass tort litigation more than justify the expense of additional expertise. As
to settlement class actions, U.S. courts must overcome a natural resistance to
scrutinizing the merits of settlements, in order to address the risks of collusion
and inadequate representation inherent in such settlements. For judges accultur-
ated to an adversary system, who view their role largely in terms of resolving
disputes based on the competing presentations, launching an independent inves-
tigation into the merits must seem an odd way to spend resources after dispu-
tants have already resolved their differences through negotiation. Whether it is
possible for large numbers of U.S. judges eventually to overcome these barriers
of role, to make widespread and effective use of inquisitorial tools, remains to
be seen.
IV. INSTITUTIONAL CHOICES
Our judges are steeped in the adversary system, and lack the civil law
supports that enable and encourage inquisitorial judging. If our judges are
unable or unwilling to use the tools needed for effective handling of mass torts,
189. See APPLE & DEYLING, supra note 134, at 37.
190. See Langbein, supra note 133, at 851 & n.100. In addition, Germany's ordinary courts of first
instance contain special divisions or chambers for crime, probate, domestic relations, and commercial
law matters. See id. at 852 (citing Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz (GVG) §§ 93-95). This latter aspect of the
German system does not differ markedly from many state court systems in the United States.
191. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY CoMMIrEE (Apr. 2, 1990).
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should we turn to the legislature and administrative agencies as institutions
better suited to inquisitorial methods?
In mass torts, the adversary system of litigation has performed dismally. For
one thing, it has proved a remarkably inefficient method for compensating
victims. Too much money has gone to litigators, too little money has gone
promptly to victims, and too many defendants have gone bankrupt. In the
asbestos litigation, for example, it is widely reported that only thirty-nine
percent of money paid by defendants to resolve asbestos claims has gone to
claimants; the bulk of the money has gone to litigation fees and expenses on
both the plaintiff and defense sides. 192
Inefficiency might be tolerable if it came with some assurance of consistent
justice. Individual outcomes for mass tort plaintiffs, however, can be haphazard.
Similarly situated plaintiffs may win or lose depending on individual juries,
lawyers, and experts. 193 Add to this inconsistency the rare but occasionally
enormous punitive damages award, 19 4 and the system can take on the appear-
ance of a lottery.
Observers of particular mass tort litigations have commented on courts'
inability to deal with them. The Agent Orange litigation of the early 1980s has
been called a "perfect example of the inadequacy of our traditional procedural
192. See Deborah R. Hensler, Fashioning a National Resolution of Asbestos Personal Injury
Litigation: A Reply to Professor Brickman, 13 CARDOZO L. REv. 1967, 1977 (1992) (citing JAMES A.
KAKALIK ET AL., COSTS OF ASBESTOS LMGATION (1983) ("RAND Study")). The RAND Study's 39%
compensation figure dates back to the early 1980's, and reflects transaction costs from a period when
asbestos litigation had not fully matured as a mass tort litigation. See Francis E. McGovern, Resolving
Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV. 659 (1989) (developing concept of maturity of mass
torts). Current asbestos litigation proceeds on a foundation of previously resolved issues and along
well-worn paths of argument, and therefore presumably involves somewhat lower transaction costs.
Nevertheless, the RAND Study finding reflects an atrocious level of transaction costs at least at the
immature stage, and thus continues to inform the debate over resolution of mass torts through litigation.
I am cognizant of Francis McGovern's warning not to allow the uniquely gigantic case of asbestos to
"taint our understanding of other mass torts." Francis E. McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Torts for
Judges, 73 TEx. L. REv. 1821, 1836-37 (1995). Yet I believe lessons can be learned from the asbestos
saga. First, Dalkon Shield, breast implants, and above all tobacco-along with yet unimagined mass
litigation-suggest that asbestos is not so unique as an enormous mass tort. Second, for purposes of the
inquisitorial devices discussed in this article, there may be little difference between the extraordinarily
huge mass tort and the merely ordinarily huge one.
193. Compare, e.g., Raulerson v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 95-01820-CA, 1997 WL 406340
(May 5, 1997 FJVR) (jury verdict for defendant in Florida wrongful death tobacco suit) with Widdick v.
Brown & Williamson (jury verdict awarding plaintiff $500,000 compensatory damages and $450,000
punitive damages in Florida wrongful death tobacco suit) (reported in Barry Meier, Cigarette Maker Is
Liable in Smoker's Death, N.Y. TIMEs, June 11, 1998, at A26). See also Eric D. Green, Advancing
Individual Rights Through Group Justice, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 791, 802-03 (1997) (comparing a
plaintiff who recovered $3 million with a similarly situated plaintiff who received nothing).
194. See, e.g., O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, 821 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir. 1987) ($10 million
punitive damages verdict in toxic shock syndrome case). Although occasional huge punitive awards
exacerbate the inconsistencies of individualized litigation, punitive damages are awarded only in about
3% of all civil jury verdicts, and the median punitive award is about $50,000 (the mean is substantially
higher). See Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 623,
633 (1997).
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system to cope with mass disasters." 195 The Bendectin litigation, too, "demon-
strates that the tort system can go awry." 196 Courts have faced severe criticism
for their handling of the scientific aspects of the breast implant litigation.' 97 As
one court lamented in the context of the breast implant litigation, "the tradi-
tional tort system simply does not work in mass tort situations." 98
No mass tort litigation, however, has received more intense criticism than the
litigation concerning exposure to asbestos. A recent legislative proposal for an
asbestos compensation system catalogues the concerns plainly:
(1) Asbestos personal injury litigation is unfair and inefficient, and imposes a
crushing burden on litigants and taxpayers alike.
(2) Asbestos litigation has already led to the bankruptcy of more than 15
companies ....
(3) The extraordinary volume of asbestos litigation is straining State and
Federal courts ....
(4) Asbestos litigation has resulted in arbitrary verdicts, with individuals receiv-
ing widely varying recoveries despite similar medical conditions ....
(7) Litigation has not been able to provide compensation to claimants swiftly
(8) Litigation has also proved to be an extraordinarily costly means of
resolving claims of asbestos-related disease. Less than 50 percent of the
total cost of asbestos litigation actually goes to compensate claimants,
while the remainder is eaten up in attorneys' fees and other litigation
costs. 199
Given the nature of complex multiparty litigation, as well as the clash between
scientific and judicial inquiry, it is hardly surprising that courts in an adversary
system find it almost impossible to address mass torts effectively. 2°°
Many judges, lawyers and litigants caught up in mass tort problems have
attempted admirably to find solutions. In scientifically complex mass tort cases,
seeking input from court-appointed experts makes good sense. Too many courts,
195. ALl, COMPLEX LITIGATION PRoJECT 11 (1994) (citing PETER SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL:
MASS Toxic DISASTERS IN THE COURTS (1986)).
196. MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF MASS Toxic SUB-
STANCES LITIGATION 329 (1996).
197. See, e.g., ANGELL, supra note 35.
198. In re Dow Coming Corp., 211 B.R. 545, 577 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997).
199. H.R. 3905, 105th Cong. (1998); see infra note 215 and accompanying text (describing asbestos
compensation bill).
200. See Lon Fuller, The Form and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353, 394-99 (1978)
(contending that "polycentric" disputes cannot effectively be handled by the traditional role of judge as
adjudicator); Eric Kades, The Laws of Complexity and the Complexity of Laws: The Implications of
Computational Complexity Theory for the Law, 49 RUTGERS L. REv. 403, 416 (1997).
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however, seem unable to overcome their reluctance to intrude on adversarial
presentations. Settlement class actions may offer the most feasible and efficient
method for achieving global resolutions of mass torts. Settlement class actions,
however, carry serious drawbacks including the risk of collusion or inadequate
representation. They offer a satisfactory resolution only if courts can overcome
their adversary system sensibilities, and take seriously their obligation to protect
absent plaintiffs by launching vigorous independent investigations into the
merits.
Given the barriers that have prevented U.S. judges from making widespread
use of inquisitorial devices, perhaps a legislative solution to mass torts, creating
an administrative compensation scheme, would make a better approach. There
is some logic to the argument that in the United States, the legislative branch
and administrative agencies may be better suited structurally than the courts for
inquisitorial factfinding. 20  Unfortunately, it is far from clear that Congress
would do any better than the courts. Shifting from litigation to a legislative-
administrative solution may simply trade one set of institutional problems for
another.
Several commentators have urged a legislative-administrative approach to
mass torts, to remove mass torts from the inefficiencies and inconsistencies of
litigation. Judge Jack Weinstein, with a wealth of experience in such mass tort
cases as Agent Orange,2 °2 asbestos,2°3 DES,2°4 and breast implants,20 5 has
written sympathetically about proposals for legislative compensation schemes.20 6
Professor Richard Nagareda advocates an administrative approach to mass torts,
drawing upon features of the tort system. In particular, he proposes that
Congress enact a statutory framework that would allow individual claimants to
initiate agency action with regard to mass torts, and under which agencies could
take action such as the resolution of particular disputed issues. 20 7 "In a world in
201. See ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 131 (4th ed. 1981) (congressional
"committee hearings produce a prodigious amount of information"); see also Tidmarsh, supra note
166, at 1805 ("Irreducible injustice may thus explain the often-expressed view that complex cases are
not suited to the judicial process; after all, the allocation of benefits and burdens among persons seems
a peculiarly legislative matter."). Professor Judith Resnik has analogized judicial handling of mass torts
to legislative and administrative functions: "Increasingly, the line between agency and court ... blurs.
Further, in aggregative cases, courts start structuring new adjudicatory structures, delegate to mini-
agencies (called 'claims facilities'), are lobbied by special interest groups (called 'lawyers' commit-
tees'), and thus mimic efforts by legislatures to construct decisionmaking systems." Judith Resnik,
From "Cases" to "Litigation", 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 63 (1991). Professor Resnik has not,
however, advocated removing mass torts from judicial handling. See id. at 64-68.
202. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
203. See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 830 F. Supp. 686 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1993).
204. See In re DES Cases, 789 F. Supp. 552 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), appeal dismissed, 7 F.3d 20 (2d Cir.
1993).
205. See In re Breast Implant Cases, 942 F. Supp. 958 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1996).
206. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 74, at 28-29, 33-34.
207. See Richard A. Nagareda, In the Aftermath of the Mass Tort Class Action, 85 GEO. L.J. 295,
351-67 (1996) [hereinafter Nagareda, Aftermath]; see also Richard A. Nagareda, Turning from Tort to
Administration, 94 MICH. L. REv. 899, 976-81 (1996).
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which mass torts blur the conventional dividing lines between tort and adminis-
tration," Professor Nagareda argues, "the administrative state is better posi-
tioned to facilitate social consensus in an area typified by scientific indeterminacy
and political controversy."720 8
Others have urged legislation to address asbestos claims. 20 9 After its Ad Hoc
Committee on Asbestos Litigation reported that the delays and costs of asbestos
litigation "have resulted in a denial of justice and fundamental unfairness to
litigants," the Judicial Conference agreed with the committee's recommenda-
tion "that Congress consider a national legislative scheme to come to grips with
the impending disaster relating to resolution of asbestos personal injury dis-
putes." 210
The Supreme Court, in a recent foray into mass tort litigation, did not hide its
preference for a legislative solution. In striking down the asbestos settlement
class action in Amchem Products v. Windsor,211 the Court noted that Congress
could address the problem legislatively: "The argument is sensibly made that a
nationwide administrative claims processing regime would provide the most
secure, fair, and efficient means of compensating victims of asbestos exposure.
Congress, however, has not adopted such a solution.", 212 The Court stressed its
understanding of the lower courts' predicament in trying to resolve the asbestos
crisis through piecemeal litigation: "In the face of legislative inaction, the
federal courts-lacking authority to replace state tort systems with a national
toxic tort compensation regime-endeavored to work with the procedural tools
available to improve management of federal asbestos litigation. 213
Following the Court's Amchem decision, a group of six asbestos manufactur-
ers hired a lobbying firm to explore the possibility of federal legislation to
resolve asbestos claims.21 4 In May 1998, Rep. Henry Hyde introduced legisla-
tion that would establish a federal asbestos compensation administration to be
funded by asbestos defendants.21 5 It remains to be seen whether anything will
208. Nagareda, Aftermath, supra note 207, at 300.
209. See, e.g., Lester Brickman, The Asbestos Litigation Crisis: Is There a Need for an Administra-
tive Alternative, 13 CARDozo L. REV. 1819 (1992) (proposing administrative solution); see also
DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., ASBESTOS IN THE COURTS: THE CHALLENGE OF MASS Toxic TORTS 48-49
(1985) (noting that some asbestos disposition practices "look more like an administrative compensation
system operating without formal regulations than an individualized adjudicative system").
210. Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 33 (Mar. 12, 1991).
211. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
212. Id. at 628-29; see also id. at 622 ("The benefits asbestos-exposed persons might gain from the
establishment of a grand-scale compensation scheme is a matter fit for legislative consideration .... ).
In this regard, the Court agreed with Judge Becker of the Third Circuit, who had written approvingly of
the concept of "compensation-like statutes dealing with particular mass torts." Georgine v. Amchem
Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 634 (1996), affd sub nom. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231
(1997).
213. 521 U.S. at 599.
214. See Asbestos Defendants Hire Lobby Firm to Seek Settlement, 13 No. 1 MEALEY'S LrIG. REP.:
ASBESTOS, Feb. 6, 1998, at 18.
215. See H.R. 3905, 105th Cong. (1998). The bill uses the title "Fairness in Asbestos Compensation
Act of 1998," and summarizes itself as "A Bill To establish legal standards and procedures for the fair,
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come of this proposal.2 16
The most significant effort, by far, to achieve a legislative solution to a mass
tort, is the sprawling set of negotiations and halted legislative attempts to
address tobacco liability. In 1997, after years of defendant victories in tobacco
litigation but with a sense that the momentum was beginning to shift in
plaintiffs' favor, 1 7 tobacco companies negotiated a settlement with plaintiffs'
lawyers and state attorneys general.21 8 Pursuant to the settlement, the tobacco
industry would submit to advertising restrictions and government regulation,
and would pay approximately $368 billion, but would be protected from class
action lawsuits and certain other litigation.219 To effectuate such a settlement,
however, the parties needed Congress to enact it as federal law. 220 The parties,
in short, sought a legislative solution to a mass tort.22 '
Although it sought a legislative solution, the tobacco pact bore a striking
resemblance to a mass tort settlement class action. The adversaries reached a
prompt, inexpensive, and efficient resolution of personal injury claims arising out of asbestos expo-
sure." Id. It was introduced by Representative Hyde on May 20, 1998, and sent to the House Judiciary
Committee. Since then, the bill has been cosponsored by Representatives Bryant, Conyers, Sensenbren-
ner, Pascrell, Norwood, Deal, Chambliss, Gekas, McIntosh, Kingston, Weller, and Barr.
216. If such legislation is enacted, it would not be the first time that Congress had entered the mass
torts fray. In the late 1960's, Congress enacted the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. § 901-945
(1994). Pursuant to that statute, coal workers with pneumoconiosis can bring claims before the Office of
Workers' Compensation. Hearings are held by Administrative Law Judges, and appeals are brought to
United States Courts of Appeals. See, e.g., Collins v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation
Programs, 932 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1991); Consolidation Coal Co. v. Hage, 908 F2d 393 (8th Cir. 1990).
By some accounts, the history of the black lung legislation has not been encouraging. See, e.g.,
HENSLER ET AL., supra note 209, at 118 (noting "heated political battles" in Congress, and that
"[diepending on one's perspective, it has ranged from too little compensation for too few people, to too
much for too many, and perhaps back again"). The repealed National Swine Flu Immunization Program
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 247b, used a different approach. Unlike black lung claims, swine flu claims were
brought in District Courts. Thus, the swine flu legislation arguably did not constitute a legislative-
administrative rather than a judicial solution, although it established certain parameters for liability. See
In re Swine Flu Immunization Prods. Liab. Litig., M.D.L. No. 330, 89 F.R.D. 695 (D.D.C. 1981);
Kenneda v. United States, 815 F. Supp. 926 (S.D. W. Va. 1993); see also Jones v. Wyeth Laboratories,
583 F.2d 1070 (8th Cir. 1978) (upholding constitutionality of Swine Flu Immunization Program Act). A
third piece of mass tort legislation, the 1986 National Childhood Vaccine Program Injury Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 300aa-34 (1994), established a no-fault compensation program for vaccine-related injuries. The
program compensates victims according to a set schedule of limited damages, along the lines of
Workers' Compensation. See Dan L. Burk & Barbara A. Boczar, Biotechnology and Tort Liability: A
Strategic Industry at Risk, 55 U. Prrr. L. REV. 791, 850-52 (1994).
217. See Lowenthal & Erichson, supra note 15, at 1006 n.88 (discussing 1994 formation of powerful
group of plaintiffs' attorneys who agreed to coordinate efforts and fund a multimillion dollar war chest
for litigation against tobacco defendants).
218. See PETER PRINGLE, CORNERED: BIG TOBACCO AT THE BAR OF JusTICE 281-307 (1998); Robert
Pear, Now the Archenemies Need Each Other, N.Y. TtMEs, June 22, 1997, at Dl.
219. See Pear, supra note 218, at D1.
220. See id.; Anne E. Cohen, Mass Tort Litigation After Amchem, SC57 ALI-ABA 269, 317-18
(1998).
221. Some commentators applauded the shifting responsibility as a welcome end to mass injury
litigation. "When a case includes millions of victims, the focus has to broaden beyond personal injury
to social injury as well .... Those are judgments best made by legislators.., and not courts." Philip K.
Howard, Congress Must Be Judge and Jury, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1997, at A19.
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negotiated settlement, satisfying the plaintiffs' demand for compensation and
other relief, and satisfying the defendants' demand for a global resolution with
some protection from future litigation. The parties then went hand in hand to the
locus of power for governmental approval and enforcement. At that point, the
relationship between the original parties was no longer adversarial.222 Faced
with former disputants now speaking with one voice, the government actor took
up the responsibility of launching its own inquiry into the merits to determine
whether the negotiated resolution was satisfactory. Whereas settlement class
actions make the court the relevant government actor to inquire into the fairness
of a settlement, the tobacco negotiations made Congress the relevant actor.
Congress played the role with gusto-too much gusto, in the end-vigorously
investigating, revising, and ultimately rejecting the proposed terms of the
negotiated agreement.223
As a mass tort too vast to be solved by individual adjudications but appar-
ently unsolvable as well by class actions, 224 and as a major public policy issue,
tobacco liability might appear well-suited for congressional handling. When
tobacco opponents and the tobacco industry approached Congress in 1997 with
a negotiated resolution that offered, if not the ultimate solution, then at least a
plausible starting point for legislative consideration, one might have believed
that the tobacco litigation was moving quickly toward a legislative solution.
One might even have believed that the tobacco controversy's fast-approaching
resolution, compared with the course of the asbestos, breast implant and other
mass tort litigations, would be relatively efficient and just. In the end, however,
Congress did not prove itself capable of resolving the controversy at all. As
222. "How closely the state attorneys general, public health groups and cigarette makers will work
together is unclear. But they share a common objective, translating their agreement into an enforceable
Federal law.... Together, they may become a new sort of lobby, prodding Congress to bless the
agreement they forged." Id. Although the original disputants no longer maintained an adversarial
posture, the problem retained some adversarial aspects, as objectors to the settlement played an
adversarial role. See supra note 76.
223. See Laurie McGinley & Jeffrey Taylor, Players Deciding the Fate of Tobacco Settlement
Include Bureaucrats, Lobbyists and Lawmakers, WALL ST. J., June 25, 1997, at A24. The settlement
rejection was aided in part by expert panels such as the Committee on Tobacco Policy and Public
Health, assembled to advise Congress on the proposal. See Neil A. Lewis, Citing Flaws, Health Panel
Rejects Deal on Tobacco, N.Y. TIMEs, June 26, 1997, at D6.
224. See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996) (decertifying tobacco
litigation class action); Lyons v. American Tobacco Co., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18365 (S.D. Ala. Oct.
1, 1997) (expressing skepticism about class certification on allegations similar to those in Castano);
Arch v. American Tobacco Co., 175 F.R.D. 469 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (refusing to certify tobacco litigation
class action); Walker v. Liggett, 175 F.R.D. 226 (S.D. W. Va. 1997) (rejecting tobacco settlement class
action); Smith v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 174 F.R.D. 90 (W.D. Mo. 1997) (refusing to
certify tobacco litigation class action); Small v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 1998 N.Y. Slip. Op. 09163, 1998
WL 767651 (N.Y. App. July 16, 1998) (decertifying five tobacco litigation class actions pleaded under
consumer fraud theory); cf Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 176 F.R.D. 479 (E.D. Pa. 1997)
(certifying Rule 23(b)(2) tobacco class action seeking solely medical monitoring relief). But cf
Schmitt, supra note 86 (reporting on revised 1998 Liggett settlement class action, filed and awaiting
approval in Alabama state court, after rejection of earlier settlement class action by federal court in
Walker v. Liggett).
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legislative efforts came to focus on the bill introduced by Sen. John McCain,225
under which tobacco companies would have paid $516 billion over twenty-five
years, faced a $1.10-per-pack increase in cigarette taxes, and lost some of the
litigation protection included in the negotiated agreement, 226 the tobacco indus-
try launched a vigorous campaign to defeat the bill. 227 The industry's efforts
paid off in a maneuver by Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott that effectively
removed the bill from consideration, 228 despite the bill's overwhelming biparti-
san support from the Senate Commerce Committee.229 Despite progress in
resolving government claims to recoup tobacco-related health care expendi-
tures, the huge core of the tobacco litigation-individual and class claims by
private plaintiffs injured by tobacco-remains unresolved.23°
The tobacco experience points to the leading argument against leaving mass
torts to legislative-administrative solutions-the politicization of justice and the
risk of capture by regulated industries.23' Whatever the courts' problems, they
225. Universal Tobacco Settlement Act, S. 1415, 105th Cong. (1997).
226. See Saundra Torry, Tobacco Bill Skirts Liability, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 1998, at A1.
227. See Jeffrey Taylor, RJR's Chief Says Tobacco Deal Is Dead, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 1998, at A3
(reporting tobacco companies' decision to fight McCain bill, and to cease negotiating with Congress
and others on the tobacco settlement).
228. In June 1998, Senator Lott urged fellow Republicans to vote against ending floor debate
through cloture, see David E. Rosenbaum, Tobacco Bill on Edge as Partisan Fight Erupts in Senate,
N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1998, at A15 [hereinafter Rosenbaum, Tobacco Bill on Edge], and characterized the
legislation as a "spending bill" that should be withdrawn. See David E. Rosenbaum, Lott Wants
Tobacco Bill Withdrawn, N.Y. TiMEs, June 9, 1998, at A14. Assured that the bill lacked the 60 votes
needed for cloture, Lott called for the cloture vote. Three votes short, the bill was sent back to
committee, and supporters acknowledged that there was little chance of reviving the bill within the
year. See David E. Rosenbaum, Senate Drops Tobacco Bill With '98 Revival Unlikely, N.Y. TIMtES, June
18, 1998, at Al.
229. The Senate Commerce Committee had approved the bill by a 19-to-i bipartisan vote. See
Rosenbaum, Tobacco Bill on Edge, supra note 228, at A15.
230. In late 1998, five tobacco companies reached an historic $206 billion settlement with the
attorneys general of 46 states, having settled already with the other four states. The settlements ended
lawsuits filed by the states against the tobacco industry to recover public health costs attributable to
smoking. The deal does nothing, however, to resolve the tobacco claims of tens of millions of potential
private plaintiffs, either as individual lawsuits or as class actions. See Milo Geyelin, Forty-Six States
Agree to Accept $206 Billion Tobacco Settlement, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 1998, at B13. Likewise, the
federal government's planned lawsuit against the tobacco industry, see Barry Meier, Tobacco Industry
Shocked by Clinton's Plan to Sue, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1999, at A20, will not determine any private
plaintiffs' claims against cigarette manufacturers, and thus leaves unaddressed a vast portion of the
tobacco mass tort litigation.
231. This concern is powerfully expressed with regard to products liability law in Carl T. Bogus,
War on the Common Law: The Struggle at the Center of Products Liability, 60 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1995).
Professor Bogus suggests that legislators have neither the time nor the political incentive to "reach a
considered judgment" about products liability law:
This is precisely the kind of issue on which a legislator is most vulnerable to political
pressure-a matter that may seem relatively minor in the grand scheme of things and will be
invisible to the electorate. If [a member of Congress] received a call from the chief executive
officer of the prefabricated home company or the truck factory in his district asking him to
vote for a products liability bill, he would be hard pressed to say no.
Id. at 67.
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remain more independent of interest-group pressure than either Congress or
administrative agencies. Traditionally, tort defendant lobbyists have been coun-
tered by the trial lawyer lobby, in particular the Association of Trial Lawyers of
America, but a shift from judicial to legislative-administrative handling of mass
torts may remove some of the trial lawyer lobby's incentives.232 Legislative
removal of mass torts from the courts may simply trade judicial disadvantages
for legislative and administrative ones.23 3
I am mindful, of course, of the overwhelming question when evaluating mass
tort resolutions or anything else: "compared to what? ' 234 Resolution of mass
torts by a judiciary largely unprepared for inquisitorial responsibilities may be
troubling, but no more so than resolution of mass torts by an agency or
legislature subject to capture or political pressure. And if recent trends portend
an evolution toward greater willingness to adopt inquisitorial methods when
circumstances so warrant, then perhaps in the long term judicial handling of
mass torts need not be so troubling after all.
CONCLUSION
There is cause for optimism, I believe, in the initiative of some mass tort
courts to employ independent scientific experts. I am impressed, as well, by the
efforts of some courts to take advantage of the thoroughness of settlement class
actions while carefully probing the settlement to protect the interests of absent
class members. In fact, the logic of using court-appointed experts to help
resolve essential scientific disputes in high-stakes litigation, and the logic of
vigorously delving into the merits of settlement class actions, seems so clear
that one wonders why such judging is not more widespread.
A comparative perspective helps to explain the under-use of these devices.
The tools of inquisitorial justice, after all, do not rest within their toolbox
disconnected from other characteristics of the civil law systems. A look at
inquisitorial fact-gathering in civil law countries shows that it functions within a
232. Cf. Nagareda, Aftermath, supra note 207, at 364-65 (acknowledging concerns about agency
capture by mass tort defendants, but arguing that the plaintiffs' bar, victim support groups, and other
organizations can counteract the defendants' influence).
233. See Tidmarsh, supra note 166, at 1814-15 (supporting legislative rulemaking for judicial
procedure in complex cases, but not legislative removal of complex cases from the judicial process:
"Because legislative or administrative resolution can at best substitute one form of discrimination
against like claims or claimants for another, the claim for legislative or administrative resolution of
complex cases is not compelling.").
234. The question echoes through the literature. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 112, at 1347 ("Easy as
it is to point out that mass tort litigation involves high transaction costs, one must move on to the
inevitable next question: 'compared to what?' "); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Settlement Black Box, 75
B.U. L. REv. 1257, 1257 (1995) (noting, as to objections to the fairness of global asbestos settlements,
"The question, of course, is 'fair as compared to what?' "); Resnik, supra note 98, at 885 (commenting
that the Amchem opinions on the fairness or goodness of the agreement "reflect the ever-present
question: fair or good (in terms of both outcome and process) as compared to what?"); John A.
Siliciano, Mass Torts and the Rhetoric of Crisis, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 990, 1000 (1995) ("Pronouncing
such [mass tort litigation] costs 'too high' begs the question, 'compared to what?' ").
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judicial culture and structure quite different from our own, and significantly
better suited than our own to enabling and encouraging independent judicial
inquiry into the merits of a dispute. Even as we press U.S. judges to appoint
their own scientific experts where necessary and to launch their own inquiries
into the fairness of settlement class actions, we should be realistic about the
barriers judges must overcome if they are to embrace such inquisitorial methods
effectively or dependably. The U.S. judge is steeped in noninquisitorial justice.
The ingrained assumptions of the adversary system, the judicial self-image as
umpire and lawmaker rather than as investigator, the judicial appointment as
capstone to a successful career of advocacy rather than as civil service career
track, the absence of training in investigative techniques, career incentives that
largely ignore fact-gathering, the lack of specialized courts-all these character-
istics of the U.S. legal system stand as barriers to effective inquisitorial judging
in general, and to effective use of court-appointed experts and settlement class
actions in particular.
It is tempting to sidestep these hurdles of judicial culture and structure by
embracing proposals for legislative-administrative solutions. But Congress has
problems of its own. The recent history of the tobacco dispute provides little
reason for optimism, at least in the short term, that mass torts will find just and
efficient solutions on Capitol Hill.
Moving forward, armed with a clear understanding of the cultural and
structural barriers that must be overcome, we can try to enable U.S. judges to
use inquisitorial devices adeptly in mass tort litigation, as some courts have
begun to do. So far, neither the judiciary nor the legislature has proved itself
very effective, on the whole, at handling mass torts. But we can be cheered by
glimpses of what may be formative moments in an evolution toward more
effective inquisitorial judging in mass tort litigation.
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